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Abstract 
The main objective of the thesis is to analyse the suitability of inflation targeting, a 
monetary policy regime which focuses on the achievement of the price stability, for the 
emerging market economies. The performance of inflation targeting countries is compared 
to the performance of non-inflation targeting countries which use other monetary policies 
such as the monetary aggregate target or exchange rate anchor. Regressions, using the 
difference-in-differences estimation approach, are run to assess the contribution of the 
inflation targeting framework to the development of economic variables such as the CPI, 
GDP, national interest rate etc. Economic outcomes of the financial crisis period (2007-
2010) are crucial part of the thesis. The convenience of the inflation targeting framework 
for the emerging market economies is derived. This holds also for the severe situations 
such as the crisis since it lowers the volatility of the main variables of the interest. 
Keywords: inflation targeting, monetary economics, monetary policy, emerging market 
economies, difference in differences estimation, financial crisis 
Abstrakt  
Hlavním cílem diplomové práce je analýza vhodnosti pouţití inflačního cílování, tedy 
reţimu měnové politiky zaměřujícího se na dosaţení cenové stability, v zemích 
rozvojových ekonomik. Výsledky dosaţené zeměmi, které jako svou měnovou politiku 
vyuţívají inflační cílování jsou zde srovnány s výsledky dosaţenými zeměmi, které 
pouţívají jiné druhy měnové politiky. Těmi jsou například cílování peněţní zásoby nebo 
cílování měnového kurzu. Efekt inflačního cílování na vývoj ekonomických ukazatelů 
rozvojových ekonomik je měřen za pouţití metody diference v diferencích. Jde zejména o 
proměnné postihující vývoj inflace, HDP, úrokové sazby apod. Důleţitou součástí práce 
jsou ekonomické výsledky dosaţené během období krize (2007-2010). Z diplomové práce 
vyplývá vhodnost zavedení inflačního cílování v rozvojových zemích a to také pro období 
krize, protoţe vede ke sníţení variability hlavních ekonomických ukazatelů. 
Klíčová slova: inflační cílovaní, monetární ekonomie, měnová politika, rozvojové 
ekonomiky, odhad diference v diferencích, finanční krize 
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1. Introduction 
Inflation targeting is one of the possible monetary policy frameworks used by the central 
banks to maintain the price stability as their primary monetary policy goal. The price 
stability is in this case maintained by setting the particular level of inflation or specific 
boundary levels that the central bank aims to achieve. The actual inflation is then 
maintained to move towards the set target through the changes in the monetary policy 
instruments, most frequently interest rates. The empirical evidence suggests the inflation 
targeting to be a successful framework to maintain the price stability and numerous central 
banks over the world follow this flexible policy rule. Recent data and outcomes of related 
literature show the evidence of inflation targeting mainly for the industrial and developed 
countries, which implemented this framework among the first. The inflation targeting has 
been increasingly discussed for the case of emerging market economies as well, but the 
analysis for this group of countries is still more limited. This holds especially for the time 
period of the recent global financial crisis.  
The aim of this work is therefore to evaluate the inflation targeting in relation to the 
emerging market economies. While the use of this policy was successful over the time 
among the developed countries, it should be explored if this is the right possibility for the 
emerging market economies. The assessment of the framework should be derived for the 
purposes of the price and economic stability during the financial and economic crisis and 
its afterglow. This is topic so far lacking in the economic literature of the emerging market 
economies. While the overreliance on the inflation targeting has been questioned during 
the crisis, it should be also compared with other possible monetary frameworks. 
The assessment of these issues is relevant nowadays because the economies are at the end 
or even in the afterglow of the economic crisis. With the recovery of the economies and 
their related public sector indebtedness, the era of higher inflation, compared with the pre-
crisis state, may follow. Therefore the most suitable framework for maintaining the price 
stability should be known and used especially by the emerging market economies (EMEs) 
which affect the global economy in increasing manner. EMEs are the most vulnerable 
economies to the external shocks and they suffer from high volatility of main economic 
variables. These negative issues could be partly overcome by the inflation targeting 
implementation in the emerging market economies and this work aims to support this 
argument (IMF 2011). 
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The structure of the work is following. Chapter 2 is devoted to the operational framework 
of the inflation targeting and its characteristics. It also includes the discussion of the 
preconditions of the inflation targeting implementation and specifies selected emerging 
market economies. Chapter 3 discusses the financial crisis period (2007 – 2010) since the 
evaluation of behaviour of the economic variables under this framework is crucial part of 
the work. Chapter 4 includes subchapters dealing with development in specific economic 
variables such as the CPI, GDP, output gap or real effective exchange rate. Chapter 5 
presents the main econometric method used here to compare the different monetary policy 
outcomes, the difference in differences. Using this approach the subchapters deliver 
regressions and results regarding the main economic indices. Chapter 6 extends the 
estimations for other economic indicators such as the national interest rate, balance of trade 
or unemployment rate. Following chapter 7 deals with future predictions of the 
implementation and existence of the inflation targeting regime and chapter 8 concludes the 
work with the summary of main findings. 
Literature overview  
To assess the outcomes of the inflation targeting and data for particular countries, relevant 
literature and specific country´s monetary authority information is used in this work. Other 
official sources of information, such as the IMF´s International Financial Statistics or 
OECD statistics, are used.  
The basic structure of the inflation targeting is properly derived by Svensson. His 
contribution to the discussions and developments in the theoretical field of this monetary 
policy is of the main importance since his work is among the most quoted while touching 
the inflation targeting issue. Therefore are his findings the main source for the theoretical 
background of this work. Another important author in this field is Walsh. His research 
pioneered the inflation targeting and his theoretical findings on this framework are 
presented throughout the work. Since this work includes also descriptive parts where the 
relevant authors and their thoughts are quoted, broader literature overview is not necessary.   
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2. The inflation targeting framework 
Focus on this monetary policy framework is crucial since it stands for an advanced tool for 
lowering the level of inflation as well as its maintenance on the low level. Hand in hand 
with this goes the ability to guide the inflation expectations of the economic agents 
(Svensson and Woodford 2004) without any negative impact in terms of the output 
volatility (Rogger and Stone 2005). 
2.1. Operation of the inflation targeting 
However, according to King, the inflation targeting is a professional decision making 
process and does not stand for the exact answer to crucial economic questions. Therefore 
the overreliance on the inflation targeting regime should not be present and its advantages 
should not be seen as a direct proof that the regime is the most suitable for every economy. 
In fact, King suggests that the regime of the explicit inflation target is just the 
implementation of an “optimal policy reaction function” (King 2004, 13). Svensson 
expands the discussion of the regime with the definition of reaching the desirable approach 
with the inflation forecasting mechanism (Svensson and Woodford 2004). 
The monetary policy actions are performed by the instrument and targeting rules 
(Svensson). The instrument rule can be a function of the predetermined variables (than it is 
called an explicit instrument rule) or of the forward looking variables (implicit instrument 
rule) (L. E. Svensson 1998, a). The explicit rule might be of the form       , which is a 
linear reaction function (f being ni x n1 matrix, response coefficients) and the implicit rule 
might be of the form            (g ... matrix of appropriate dimension; f and g are 
prescribed). As the simple instrument rule, the Taylor rule is derived in following form:   
                     1  
The Taylor rule is than an explicit instrument rule in the case of predetermined    and    at 
t and an implicit instrument rule in the case of the forward-looking variables at t. Inflation 
targeting may be also called “a targeting rule with a relatively explicit loss function to be 
minimized” (L. E. Svensson 1998, 13, a). The loss function can be generally interpreted in 
the following way 
                                                 
1
 “it ... federal funds rate in quarter t,   ... average federal funds rate(4%),    ... 4-quarter inflation,    ...output 
gap, federal funds rate responds to deviations of inflation from 2% level and to the output gap with 
coefficients 1.5 and 0.5“ (L. E. Svensson, Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule 1998, 6). 
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   2. 
 The relative weights on output gap stabilization λ further implies whether the regime 
represents strict inflation targeting, λ=0, or the flexible one, λ>0. Svensson, together with 
other authors, uses the flexible approach for their simulations, since “in practice, inflation 
targeting is never “strict” but always “flexible” (L. E. Svensson 2010, 1). 
The money targeting based monetary policy might be criticised for its overreliance on the 
money demand behaviour, the inability of central banks to predict it precisely. On the other 
hand, similar issue might occur under the inflation targeting since the authority, the central 
bank, does not have perfect control over the inflation. The limited ability to control the 
inflation is reinforced by the “lags in the transmission mechanism” (L. E. Svensson 1998, 
15, a) as already described above and the uncertainty about the process of the transmission 
including possible shocks faced by the economy. This partially explains why it is difficult 
to access the outcome of the regime. The time which elapses between the policy setting 
and its effect on the economy is crucial while other issues might enter the process during 
the period. To overcome these disadvantages, the inflation targeting is incomplete without 
the forecasting of the future stance of the economy and the crucial variables involved. 
Therefore is the “inflation-forecast targeting” used as an explicit rule of the inflation 
targeting regime (L. E. Svensson 1998, a). The central bank manages the interest rate of its 
monetary policy to maintain the inflation forecast accordingly to the inflation target it has 
set before (de Mello 2008, 109). Together with the target, the forecasting model and 
reports on inflation (means of the communication of the policy to the public which enhance 
the transparency of its actions), is the inflation forecast targeting the most important part of 
the inflation targeting approach (de Mello 2008). Crucial part of the forecast targeting are 
then so called escape clauses which should explain why the target have not been met for 
example since the economy faced unexpected shocks and therefore the transparency and 
accountability of the central bank should not be harmed (Fuhrer, et.al. 2009). It does not 
matter if the authority implementing inflation targeting regime uses modified Phillips 
curve or the forward looking Taylor rule for the forecasting of the inflation. The general 
consensus remains that the model cannot be used alone and that more information outside 
the model have to be included to the research to conduct “modern and practical monetary 
policy” (L. E. Svensson 1998, 18, a).  
                                                 
2
    ... inflation in period t,   ... inflation target (or in some cases may stand for the midpoint of the target 
band),    ...output gap,     ... relative weights on stabilizing the output gap (L. E. Svensson 1998, 14, a). 
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Those are only few issues to demonstrate the importance of the use of the open economy 
inflation targeting approach. The emerging market economies this work deals with are the 
case of open economies and therefore the distribution of the shocks and other economic 
disturbances brought by this channel need to be also considered. Regarding the 
development of the international trade and the approach of the economies worldwide 
which integrates higher openness of the markets, the exchange rate should be included in 
the discussion. This helps to simulate the economy behaviour in more adequate way since 
it adds another transmission channel. As for example Svensson states the appearance of the 
exchange rate shows its influence on the” foreign and domestic demand for domestic 
goods” (L. E. Svensson 1998, 3, b) and therefore influences the aggregate demand channel. 
This implies for the effects of the real exchange rate
3
.  For the purposes of the inflation 
measures, the consumer price index (CPI) is generally used and therefore the exchange rate 
changes might influence the inflation directly through the changes it does to the prices of 
imported goods which enter the CPI basket. As all the transmission mechanisms involve 
lags, the importance of the exchange rate here is that the lag associated with its direct 
influence on the CPI is supposed to be smaller than the one generated in the aggregate 
demand channel (L. E. Svensson 2010). 
2.2. Characteristics of the inflation targeting 
As the evidence says, the inflation targeting enhanced the macroeconomic performance of 
emerging market economies. It also proved that one of its essential features, “commitment 
to an explicit target”, enables it to overcome the “demand shocks and financial crises” 
(Walsh 2009, 1, a). Using this specific target, the central bank is able to measure its 
performance by comparing the achieved level of inflation to the announced target (L. E. 
Svensson 1996).  This kind of measurement is also applicable for the inflation expectations 
and in general, this provides the central bank with the assessment of its credibility. The 
monetary policy actions are therefore easy to evaluate and the central bank gains 
accountability. That creates a commitment process which can reduce potential inflation 
bias and help to achieve the desired level of inflation as well as inflation expectations (L. 
                                                 
3
 Using the aggregate demand channel, the monetary policy is transmitted through the effect on the aggregate 
demand caused by changes in the short real interest rate. The inflation rate is than affected by the aggregate 
demand through the aggregate supply equation, the Phillips curve. Third crucial channel is the expectations 
channel through which are the inflation expectations of the economic agents influenced by the use of “wage 
and price setting” (L. E. Svensson, Open-Economy Inflation Targeting 1998, 3). All these actions include 
different time lags. 
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E. Svensson 1996). The inflation targeting system stands on pillars that at the same time 
create the whole framework and are further reinforced by its actions.  
2.2.1. The full-fledged targeting 
According to Stone (2005), it is possible to divide the monetary policies that use some 
inflation target into three main types due to the differences in credibility in commitment to 
the announced inflation target. These are: “full-fledged inflation targeting, implicit price 
stability anchor” and “inflation targeting lite” (Carare and Stone 2005, 1297). For the 
purposes of this work, the full-fledged inflation targeting is most important.  This is the 
type of inflation targeting with the highest level of credibility
4
 and commitment to the 
inflation target. It is a transparent monetary rule which promotes the central bank´s 
credibility to the announced target (Carare and Stone 2005). The full-fledged inflation 
targeting contains the basic stylized facts that can help to guard the emerging market 
economies to follow the industrial countries in inflation targeting framework 
implementation (Rogger and Stone 2005). Inflation targeting is highly linked to the need 
for transparency and accountability. These elements enable to the central bank to gain 
credibility and to enforce its incentives in meeting the stated target of inflation (Rogger and 
Stone 2005).  
  
                                                 
4
 “Credibility is proxied by the actual inflation outturn and by market ratings of long-term local currency 
government debt“ (Carare a Stone 2005, 1298). 
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2.2.2. Challenges of the IT adoption 
The inflation targeting comprises special challenges for the emerging market economies, 
these are the need to “build credibility; reduce the level of inflation, and to deal with fiscal, 
financial and external dominance” (Fraga, et.al. 2003, 14). Many problems are enhanced 
by the weakness of the institutions, including the central bank, and by the time needed to 
build the credibility, since there are no records of the past actions the authority have done 
aiming for the inflation reduction or stabilization. The EMEs adopted the inflation 
targeting with relatively high levels of inflation. As Fraga et al suggest in their study from 
2003, this was on average 13.1%. The countries used for the purposes of this work show 
average inflation rate at the time of adoption of 6.6%. The difference between the two 
results is caused by different sample of emerging market economies adopting IT used in 
each case. This work uses sample of 19 IT countries. Only in situations where data for 
particular country and period are not available, the country is omitted from the sample. 
Fraga et al used sample of 12 countries and their average year of IT adoption was 1997 
while this works´ countries have adopted the IT on the average in 2002. Therefore the 
average inflation at the time of the IT regime adoption differs. This work reflects countries 
that newly implemented the regime and also the fact that some of the countries, e.g. the 
Czech Republic or Israel as included by Fraga et al, are not listed as emerging economies 
anymore. Some authors argue that the level of 10% of CPI should stand for a threshold for 
the framework adoption but the practise shows that the presence of declining trend is more 
important (Rogger and Stone 2005). 
Higher levels of the inflation explain why the disinflationary targets were set at the 
beginning rather than the usual inflation targets known e.g. from advanced economies 
performing the IT. The disinflationary targets are short term targets and the authority tends 
to reach the desired low level of the inflation to be set as a future target for some longer 
horizon. Along with the inflation lowering emerges a possible threat of output volatility 
which would enhance the costs of inflation reduction. Therefore a trade-off between 
followed economic variables maintenance needs to be done to balance the costs and profits 
coming from lower inflation (Fraga, et.al. 2003).  
The reduction in the inflation rate follows large target misses. Although the banks´ 
commitment to particular target would seem to require very strict following of it by every 
means, the opposite is actually true. The experience of the IT countries report numerous 
misses of the targets under the flexible inflation targeting. Countries maintaining stable 
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inflation miss the target with probability of 1/3 and those with disinflation policies with the 
probability of 2/3 (Rogger and Stone 2005). 
2.2.3. Preconditions of the IT implementation 
The central bank as a monetary authority of inflation targeting country needs to posses 
following essential issues of this framework to be able to meet the inflation target (Rogger 
and Stone 2005, 6). 
First issue covers the main goal of this monetary policy. That is a price stability delivered 
by the low inflation and only for this goal a specific numerical target is stated 
(International Monetary Fund 2006). Level of inflation is in the medium term the issue this 
monetary policy can focus on. The explicit quantitative target of inflation is usually in the 
form of a point or an interval varying from 1.5 to 2.5 percent per year (L. E. Svensson 
1998, b). The central bank´s responsibility is than to commit that it will maintain the rate of 
inflation to this explicit target (Apergis, et.al. 2005). In the same time, no specific 
intermediate targets of the monetary policy, for example exchange rate target or money 
growth target, are set under inflation targeting (L. E. Svensson 1996). 
Next crucial issue that characterises the inflation targeting is an operating procedure of the 
monetary policy called inflation forecast targeting (L. E. Svensson 1998, b).  This is also 
the optimal intermediate targeting rule for the inflation targeting and stands for a mean 
ensuring that the first order conditions for the minimum of the loss function are fulfilled 
(L. E. Svensson 1998, b). According to the broadly accepted view that the emerging 
market economies possess low credibility of the monetary authority and generally fragile 
institutions as well as the macroeconomic instability (Fraga, et.al. 2003), set of 
preconditions for the inflation targeting implementation is questioned. The four main 
preconditions are listed in the table 1 below. 
Table 1: IT implementation preconditions 
Preconditions Institutional independence 
A well-developed technical infrastructure 
Economic structure 
A healthy financial system 
Source: (Batini, et.al. 2005, 175) 
The institutional independence reassures the central bank that it can choose at least its 
instruments independently on the government or other authority.  Under the IT regime, 
central bank´s mandate should clearly introduce the explicit target for inflation and state 
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specifically that the price stability is the primary aim of bank´s actions and introduce it to 
the public (Truman 2003). Central bank should possess the legal autonomy to be able to 
resist the attempts of the politicians to use it for monetizing government deficits and 
impose other pressures on the central bank (Batini, et.al. 2005). Its independence and clear 
mandate should be accompanied with the “strong fiscal position” (Bernanke and Woodford 
2005, 357) of the economy. This requirement was not met by all adopters, for example the 
Czech and Hungary case suggests that the fiscal deficit had been significant. As Bernanke, 
claims, this did not have significantly negative consequences, since the fiscal deficit was a 
part of the transition of the economies and was not cured by the monetary means which 
would enhance the fiscal dominance of the monetary policy (Bernanke and Woodford 
2005, 357).  The fiscal dominance is one of the problems that leads to undesirable 
outcomes of the monetary policy and is in conflict with the inflation targeting. The 
government unable to finance its market actions requires seigniorage and other means of 
financing from the central bank, to be able to cover its expenditures. This makes the central 
bank weak and lowers its ability to achieve the set inflation target. While the fiscal 
situation is under control, the inflation targeting can contribute to the macroeconomic 
stability (Truman 2003). 
Another precondition is according to Batini a “well-developed technical infrastructure” 
(Batini, et.al. 2005, 175). This issue is derived from the fact, that the advantages of the 
inflation targeting regime are developed through its ability to predict future inflation and 
“anchor expectations of future inflation” (Walsh 2009, 14, a). The state of the future 
inflation is crucial for the inflation targeting while the transmission mechanism through 
which the central bank manages the goal of price stability does not have immediate effect 
on the economy. There are time lags, e.g. in the Czech case it is around 1.5 year, for the 
interest rate changes made by the central bank to be  translated to the inflation behaviour. 
Therefore for its decision making the central banks need the information about future 
inflation rather than its present state (Holman 2008). The central bank needs good inflation 
forecasting and modelling ability however, the evidence says that the inflation targeters 
begun with very simple tools or some of them with no ability of forecasting and without 
any model (Batini, et.al. 2005). In hand with this issue goes the availability of the data on 
inflation, which differs among the emerging market economies (Batini, et.al. 2005). Many 
central banks proved that they do not need perfect tools for predictions at the beginning but 
are able to find the right tools over time. They act according to its experience and with the 
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help of surveys on the current inflation try to forecast and then learn from possible 
mistakes and adjust the tools in the most desirable way (Truman 2003, 55). Process of 
finding the right level and direction of suitable policy instruments requires greater effort 
among the emerging market economies than among the industrial countries. The emerging 
market economies are more often facing the shocks coming for example from the 
deregulation of prices, significant level of economy openness and overall effort to follow 
the advanced economies. Due to the possible long period of high inflation is the current 
inflation (at the time of IT adoption) unstable in the emerging market economies 
(Bernanke and Woodford 2005, 358). As an example of not using the most difficult models 
while the economy is not yet prepared, Bernanke uses the case of the Czech National Bank 
which in the 1999 “introduced a survey of inflation forecasts by market participants to 
measure inflation expectations” (Bernanke and Woodford 2005, 358). 
The “well-developed technical infrastructure” is directly linked to the last two 
preconditions stated in the table 1, “economic structure” and “a healthy financial system”. 
In fact, all the preconditions mingle significantly. As Batini et al suggest with the help of 
their research, with the deregulated prices, low reactivity to prices of commodities and 
movements of the exchange rate as well as state of measures of “risk-weighted capital 
adequacy ratio” or “financial market depth” 5 (Batini, et.al. 2005, 177), should be the 
economy prepared to smoothly adopt the inflation targeting framework. For example the 
possibly frail banking system would cause the emergence of the requirements from the 
financial institutions on the liquidity provided to them by the central bank. Increase in the 
interest rate (done by the central bank) can be destructive for those weak institutions. 
Without the cooperation of the financial system, the central bank is trapped in inability to 
meet the target and thus lowers its credibility. Critics use this precondition to show that the 
central banks focusing on inflation can possibly divert the attention from checking the 
financial system stability (Truman 2003). 
Many authors of the related literature agree up on the fact that it is not necessary for the 
adopters to fulfil the preconditions fully but only to the certain degree to be able to 
implement inflation targeting and possibly profit from it. For example Truman argues that 
the difference between the emerging and industrial economies is exaggerated in terms that 
the emerging markets must meet the preconditions to proceed further with the inflation 
                                                 
5
 “ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, ratio of private bond issuance to GDP, stock market turnover, 
and the maximum maturity of actively traded nominal bonds“ 
21 
 
targeting.  This is in line with Batini et al survey which shows that no country (applying for 
both industrial and emerging market economies) met all the preconditions before it adopted 
the framework. The lack of fulfilment of the requirements is not restraining the emerging 
market economies. The Batini et al work presents informal econometric tests which show 
that “no precondition enters significantly in the equations explaining the improvement in 
macroeconomic performance after inflation targeting adoption” (Batini, et.al. 2005, 178).6 
2.3. Origin of the inflation targeting, the New Zealand case 
Inflation targeting appeared in the monetary policy systems in late 1980s in industrial 
countries such as New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden (listed 
according to the date of adoption of this monetary policy regime) (International Monetary 
Fund 2006). The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which is supposed to be a pioneer in 
integrating inflation targeting to the monetary policy (Rogger and Stone 2005), dates the 
implementation of the inflation targeting to the 1989. At that time the parliament released 
the Reserve Bank Act which had widened powers and competences of the bank. The 
competence of great importance is the use of independent monetary policy for dealing with 
inflation. Before the act, the bank promoted the general price stability as one of the goals 
of the monetary policy as well as for example the economical growth and level of 
employment. The focus on inflation had been underlined by the “Policy Target 
Agreement” approved by the Minister of Finance and by the Governor of the Reserve Bank 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2009). This confirmation is in line with the important 
factor of the inflation targeting, the transparency which enforced the efficient delegation of 
the monetary policy, as for example stated in Svensson (L. E. Svensson 1998, a). 
The approach of this monetary policy is that the price stability has to be defined in 
“specific and public contract” (Reserve Bank of New Zealand). The move to this monetary 
policy took a long time. From the 1950s, the Reserve Bank battled for its powers with 
strong government regulations and fixed exchange rate that was accompanied with almost 
non-existing modern financial markets. Therefore the support of economic growth, 
employment and price stability was not easy since the appropriate tools for the bank were 
missing. According to the experience with high levels of inflation in 1960s and 1970s and 
ineffective government regulations, not only New Zealand but also other industrial 
                                                 
6
 The Batini et al survey outcome is summarized in the Annex 1: Preconditions and current conditions. It 
shows the robustness check of the baseline model they use in their work where 1 stands for the best current 
practice. 
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countries, found the possibility of reducing the inflation rate by the control of money 
supply.  The Reserve Bank first took additional steps and introduced the specific target 
band for inflation (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2007). This is nowadays one of the 
bench marks of inflation targeting as a monetary policy regime. Many central banks 
adopted inflation targeting framework to overcome bad experience with other monetary 
policies which uses as intermediate targets for example exchange rate peg (either soft peg 
or hard peg) or monetary aggregates (International Monetary Fund 2006). They tried as a 
monetary policy e.g. the monetary targeting, especially in years after the collapse of 
Bretton Woods system, 1970s and 1980s (Walsh 2009, a). But as Walsh (2009) refers, 
“none of these policy regimes proved either completely successful or sustainable.” 
Regarding the inflation targeting, it is supported by the fact that while compared with the 
exchange rate regimes of monetary policy, the inflation targeting was not left by anyone 
who had adopted it previously (Walsh 2009, a). 
According to Portugal (2007), 24 countries (8 industrial, developed countries and 16 
developing and emerging market economies were using the inflation targeting as their 
policy framework in 2007 and still new central banks worldwide were considering this 
possibility. Nowadays, inflation targeting has been adopted by 29 countries (10 developed 
and 19 developing and emerging market economies) (IMF 2008).  
2.4. Emerging market economies  
With the help of IMF terms, the emerging markets could be specified as capital markets of 
some “developing countries that have liberalized their financial systems to promote capital 
flows with non-residents and are broadly accessible to foreign investors” (International 
Monetary Fund 2006, 17). 
The table 2: Inflation targeting countries shows the selected inflation targeting emerging 
market economies used in this work. For the purposes of the comparison, the advanced IT 
economies are also included. 
2.4.1. Division of monetary policy frameworks categories  
To usefully select the countries for the research the division on advanced economies and 
emerging and developing economies is done here similarly to the methodology used by the 
International Monetary Fund statistics. Using the IMF data and assuming the move of the 
Slovak Republic and Estonia among the EMU countries the table in the Annex 2 Monetary 
policy regimes shows nowadays division of monetary policy regimes worldwide according 
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to the authority behaviour towards the exchange rate.
7
 Table 2 lists countries using the 
inflation targeting framework nowadays. While excluding the advanced economies, the 
rest are the countries of the interest in this work. 
  
                                                 
7
 The division of countries into the groups according to the level of their economic development is usefully 
depicted in (IMF 2008). For the purposes of this work, please see the Annex 3. 
 
24 
 
Table 2: Inflation targeting countries 
Advanced 
Economies 
IT 
adoption 
date 
First target Current 
inflation 
target 
Current 
inflation 
(CPI) % 
CPI at 
the time 
of IT 
adoption 
United Kingdom 1992:Q3 1-4% 2% 4.7 3.7% 
Canada 
1991:Q1 
3%-5% 
2% (+-
1%) 1.8 5.6% 
Korea 2001:Q1 2.5% (+-1%) 3%(+-1%) 2.9 2.3% 
Australia 1993:Q2 2-3% 2-3% 2.8 1.8% 
Sweden 1993:Q1 2% (+-1%) 2% 1.1 4.7% 
Czech Republic 1998:Q1 5.5-6.5% 
2% (+-
1%) 1.9 10.6% 
Norway 2001:Q1 2,50% 2.50% 3.3 3.0% 
Israel 1997:Q2 7-10% 1-3% 2.0 9.0% 
New Zealand 1990:Q1 3%-5% 1-3% 1.5 6.1% 
Iceland 2001:Q1 
2.5% (-
1.5%+3.5%) 2.50% 4.4 6.4% 
Central and Eastern Europe         
Albania 2001:Q1 2-4% 
3% (+-
1%) 3.4 3.1% 
Hungary 2001:Q3 7% (+-1%) 3% 3.8 10.5% 
Poland 1999:Q1 <=9.5% 
2.5%(+-
1%) 2.2 7.3% 
Romania 2005:Q3 7.5% (+-1%) 3%(+-1%) 7.5 9.0% 
Serbia 2009:Q1 10% (+-2%) 6%(+-2%) 5.9 7.8% 
Turkey 2006:Q1 5% (+-2%) 5.50% 8.4 10.5% 
Armenia 2006:Q3 3% (+-1%) 
4%(+-
1,5%) 8.7 2.9% 
Latin America and Caribbean         
Brazil 1999:Q2 8%(+-2%) 
4.5%(+-
2%) 4.6 4.9% 
Chile 1999:Q3 15-20% 3%(+-1%) 2.1 3.3% 
Colombia 1999:Q3 15% 3%(+-1%) 2.3 10.9% 
Guatemala 2005:Q1 4-6% 5%(+-1%) 4.0 8.4% 
Mexico 2001:Q1 <=13% 3%(+-1%) 3.7 6.4% 
Peru 2002:Q1 15-20% 2%(+-1%) 2.2 0.2% 
Uruguay 2000:Q1 ? 4-6% 6.3 4.8% 
Developing Asia           
Indonesia 2005:Q3 6%(+-1%) 5%(+-1%) 5.2 10.5% 
Philippines 2002:Q1 5%-6% 4%(+-1%) 3.8 3.0% 
Thailand 2000:Q2 0%-3.5% 0.5%-3% 3.3 1.6% 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa           
Ghana 2002:Q1 22% 8.50% 9.4 14.8% 
South Africa 2000:Q1 3%-6% 3%-6% 3.5 5.3% 
 
Source: (IMF 2008) (IMF 2011), individual countries central banks 
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Figure 1: Monetary policy regimes 
 
Source: (IMF 2008) 
Figure 1 displays division of monetary policies which are used by individual countries 
worldwide. The second pillar, inflation targeting framework, includes countries performing 
independent floating or managed floating without determining the exchange rate path in 
advance. These are presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Managed and independent floating countries 
Managed floating with no predetermined path 
Armenia Ghana Indonesia Romania Thailand 
Colombia Guatemala Peru Serbia Uruguay 
Independently floating: 
Albania Estonia Italy Poland 
Australia Finland Rep.of Korea Portugal 
Austria France Luxembourg Slovak Republic 
Belgium Germany Malta Slovenia 
Brazil Greece Mexico South Africa 
Canada Hungary Netherlands Spain 
Chile Iceland New Zealand Sweden 
Cyprus Ireland Norway Turkey 
Czech Republic Israel Philippines United Kingdom 
Source: (IMF 2008) 
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For further purposes, while using the group of independent floaters, the members of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union should be excluded, not only because the EMU 
as such is not an inflation targeter in the sense the targeters are specified in this work  but 
also because the work deals with the emerging market economies.  
The countries for the control group were chosen according to the level of development and 
regional similarities. Since the work uses mainly the data delivered by the IMF, the tools to 
derive these countries were also respecting the IMF division of countries. The Monetary 
policy regimes table (as depicted in Annex 2) and the Group of countries division 
according to the level of their development (Annex 3) were the bases. Only the category of 
Emerging and developing economies (as in the Annex 3) was used. Since the Annex 2 
table shows the assignment of the monetary policy to each of the countries, only those 
emerging were used in three categories of monetary policy framework: inflation targeting, 
monetary aggregate targeting and exchange rate anchor. Few countries from other 
monetary policy framework were included to the estimations to enhance the sample of 
non-ITs. Those chosen countries were then grouped according to their regional 
characteristics. The groups are: Central and Eastern Europe, Developing Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa (as in the Annex 3). The samples varies in 
the work since the data for the comparison group sometimes lack or are only of forecasted 
values, therefore are omitted in certain measurements. Table 4 lists the countries of the 
comparison group in the geographical categories and includes the current level of CPI. The 
mean value of the CPI for these countries is 7.0%. 
Table 4: Categories of the countries 
Central and Eastern Europe Monetary policy regime 
Current 
inflation 
(CPI) %  
Bulgaria  ER anchor 2.8 
Latvia  ER anchor 3.5 
Lithuania  ER anchor 4.4 
Macedonia, FYR ER anchor -0.3 
Developing Asia       
China  ER anchor -0.7 
India OTHER 10.9 
Pakistan  OTHER 13.6 
Vietnam  ER anchor 7.1 
Latin America and 
Caribbean       
Argentina  Monetary aggregate target 6.3 
Haiti  Monetary aggregate target 0.0 
27 
 
Dominican Republic  OTHER 1.4 
Bolivia  ER anchor 3.3 
Nicaragua  ER anchor 3.7 
Venezuela, RB ER anchor 28.6 
Paraguay  OTHER 2.6 
Ecuador  ER anchor 5.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
Kenya  Monetary aggregate target 9.2 
Madagascar  Monetary aggregate target 9.0 
Malawi  Monetary aggregate target 8.4 
Mauritius  ER anchor 2.5 
Nigeria  Monetary aggregate target 11.5 
Uganda  Monetary aggregate target 13.4 
Zambia  Monetary aggregate target 13.4 
Source: (IMF 2008), (IMF 2011) 
3. The financial crisis 
Although this work does not have the ambition to judge the inevitability of the crisis as 
well as opposing issues that it might have been impossible to forecast, it does make 
remarks on the crisis itself relating it to the emerging market economies. 
As Taylor suggests, the crisis was enhanced by the inappropriate monetary policy and says 
that the behaviour of Fed have not prevented the problems even though it could have. The 
crucial issue here is the interest rate which was not managed on the sufficient level. Taylor 
stands against the low level interest rate policy during the period of 2001 – 2005 and 
explains that the Fed did not follow the Taylor rule (Taylor 2009)
8
. 
The low levels of the interest rates supported the growth in the credit which was later 
enhanced through the rising prices of the housing in the USA (Naudé 2009). The issue of 
the mortgage lending and especially the subprime mortgage lending is seen as a 
cornerstone of the financial crisis issue. Financial organizations provided the mortgage 
services to the households which were unable to pay the loans back and would not be 
eligible for a standard mortgage nowadays. Institutions such as Fanny Mae and Freddie 
Mac assured the loans and as assets sold them on the financial markets. They worked with 
main Wall Street firms “and became the largest issuers of mortgage-backed securities” 
(Gerardi, et.al. 2010, 337). This action managed to spread the financial crisis once it was 
                                                 
8
 Taylor rule as introduced in the previous part of the work. 
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clear that the institutions have crucial problems with the declining prices of the housing
9
 
and ability of the clients to repay their loans. The ongoing process escalated in September 
2008 (although the severe foreclosures on the subprime mortgages lending emerged in 
summer 2007) when the Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac were nationalized by the US 
government (7.9.2008) followed by the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers (15.9.2008) 
(Naudé 2009). Panic, through large stock selling, dominated the financial sector and spread 
rapidly over the world because of the lack of evidence of the “infected” assets position in 
portfolios of the banks and other financial institutions. Following fear of the “counterparty 
risk” and declines in stock market and real estate prices further reduced the availability of 
the credit (Naudé 2009). 
The financial interconnection among the countries affected with an instability and issues 
related to the financial crisis also the emerging market economies. The global financial 
market problems could have been translated into these countries although they adopted 
new approaches to secure their economies against swings in macroeconomic and financial 
field already prior the crisis (Braasch 2010). As Braasch suggests, the “global factors are 
increasingly important for domestic financial markets in the EMEs” (Braasch 2010, 2). The 
possibility to move financial resources from country to country without any restraints 
enables the stock markets to be correlated and e.g. the “equity correlations increase after 
liberalization of capital markets in emerging market economies” (Chung, et.al. 2010, 86). 
The World Bank data for the GDP p.c. (in current U.S. dollars) provide the following 
comparison of the GDP p.c. in different groups of countries depicted in figure 2. It shows 
that all the countries increased the GDP p.c. steadily over time. However, the division into 
the groups of different monetary policies show the difference between the MT countries 
and the IT and ER countries, which were closer to each other in terms of GDP p.c. 
volumes. Only the MT economies also faced a drop during the period, in 2002. MT 
economies followed increasing path after 2002 but in a more slowly manner than IT and 
ER countries. These two groups of economies went on similar path and all three categories 
hit the peak in 2008 from where the GDP p.c. had declined for all of them. Lower numbers 
are a consequence of the crisis behaviour of variables.  
  
                                                 
9
 Once the “bubble burst“ in the 2006, it was clear that the prices of the mortgage do not reflect the actual 
price of the real estate (Naudé 2009). 
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Figure 2: GDP volume growth (GDP p.c., USD), 1980 – 2009 
 
Source: (The World Bank 2011) 
 
4. Comparison of the IT with other monetary policy regimes 
The main problem of the inflation targeting is the estimation of its outcome. For example 
Walsh refers to “good luck” which means that there is great uncertainty whether the 
positive evolution of the inflation state in the countries of our interest is not just a cause of 
overall “good times” in the world economy. To obtain the evidence of the inflation 
targeting influence on the macroeconomic outcomes of the country, the comparison with 
outcomes of a similar country that would differ only in the non implementation of the 
monetary regime is desirable. This is the most difficult part of the analysis since it is not 
easy to say “what would have happen if the inflation targeting had not been adopted” 
(Walsh 2009, 11, a). Evolution of the main economic variables follows in next sections. 
4.1. GDP and CPI variables development 
To enable the comparison of the groups of the countries, the development of the main 
economic variables is crucial to assess. Following graphs plot the GDP and CPI percentage 
changes of the emerging market economies from the 1980 to 2010. 
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4.1.1. CPI % change in volume development 
Figure 3: CPI % change 1980 - 2010 
 
Source: (IMF 2011), own calculations 
 
Advanced economies stand here for a benchmark to compare the situation in the rest of the 
world. The extreme values for the inflation targeting countries, which at the time of the 
peaks were not IT countries yet, are affected by Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
Peru, or also Armenia, which lacks a lot of observations. For example Brazil observations 
for the CPI ranged from 228.34% in 1987 to 2075.98% in 1994 with further sharp decline 
(66.01% in 1995). However, these extreme values are rather a cause of difficult “political 
economy” situation and decisions which affected the used monetary policy. The period of 
hyperinflation is linked to the New Republic era and presidency of Sarney (Kinzo 1993)
 
. 
The period after the 2002 which is the average year to adopt the inflation targeting among 
those emerging markets, is a starting year to compare the particular regimes in detail. The 
values of the CPI percentage change are higher than among the advanced economies, 
which is in accordance to the expectations. For the IT countries, the line is smoother and 
declines over the time. Higher values around the year 2002 may be caused by the new 
adopters who faced the disinflationary phase and supported the decline from 9.46% in 
2002 to 5.53% in 2007. The peak in CPI values in 2008, as shown in figure 4, emerged 
because of the high commodity and fuel prices countries faced from the beginning of the 
year 2008. The following trade and financial failures marked the upcoming crisis of period 
2008 – 2010 (de Carvalho Filho 2010). The countries with the exchange rate anchor 
showed rising tendency over the whole decade and felt most sharply, compared to other 
regimes, during the crisis. Possibly severe situation is depicted by the Advanced 
Economies, which are a selection of different monetary policy regimes. It shows the state 
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of deflation that is the worst outcome for the economy facing the crisis while it can easily 
be “trapped” in the depression in the case that the zero or negative inflation rate would 
prevail for some longer period (Krugman 2010). However, the rising tendency is 
performed immediately after the bottom point had been hit.  
The outcome of the IT countries is a good sign of the advantages it might bring to EMEs in 
terms of more stable inflation. This issue is further developed in the following sections of 
the work and will be enhanced by the empirical analysis. 
Figure 4: CPI % change 2002 - 2010 
 
 
Source: (IMF 2011), own calculations 
 
Regarding the volatility of the CPI inflation performed by the three categories of the 
monetary policy approaches, the IT countries showed the lowest values of the standard 
deviation during the time period 2002 – 2010. On the other hand, using the range of 1980-
2010, the countries which are later on assumed as IT economies, exhibited the highest 
values of the standard deviation. The values are shown in table 5. 
Table 5: Standard deviation of CPI observations 
Standard deviation, observations  
1980 - 2010 
Standard deviation, observations  
2002 - 2010 
ER 68.41 ER 3.90 
IT 186.70 IT 3.50 
MT + 
other 16.17 
MT + 
other 5.69 
Source: (IMF 2011), own calculations 
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4.1.2. GDP % change in volume development 
The figure 5 presents the evolution of the GDP percentage change over the period of 1980 
– 2009 and shows the comparison of the emerging countries with each other. Those 
observations are delivered by the table 6. 
Figure 5: GDP % change in volume 1980 - 2009  
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
All the three representatives of different monetary policies in EMEs show significant 
changes and instability in the annual percentage changes in volume. Countries with the 
exchange rate (ER) anchor appear to have gone through the peaks and bottoms of the 
highest magnitude. This holds especially for the year 1981, where it displayed values of 
12% changes while other regimes were under the zero axis showing negative values of 
almost 1%. ER anchor economies also faced more than -2% changes during the crisis 
period while IT followed with values around -1% and monetary aggregate targeting (MT) 
plus other regimes stayed in the positive numbers. All of the frameworks performed 
similarly negative GDP percentage changes during the first half of the 1990s. 
Figure 6:  GDP % change in volume 2002 - 2008 
 
Source (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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There is again present the declining trend for the years of the financial crisis starting 
approximately in the half of the year 2007. Although other regimes show higher values 
than the IT regime, it was steadily increasing the values of the GDP percentage volume 
change through years 2002 – 2004. This was followed by 1% decline but in 2006 the 
values were back closely to 6% and remained stable until the crisis. The depicted decline 
has been most severe for the ER anchor countries, followed by the IT economies. 
Table 6: Standard deviations of GDP observations 
Standard deviation, observations 1980 - 
2009 
Standard deviation, observations 2002 - 
2009 
IT     4.78 IT     3.02 
ER   
 
6.12 ER   
 
4.69 
MT + 
others     5.07 
MT + 
others     2.95 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
Table 6 presents the standard deviation data for each monetary policy framework to 
compare the volatility of the GDP percentage changes. IT economies show on average 
lower volatility than other regimes, which might be the benefit from the monetary policy as 
such. On the other hand, the data for the period 2002-2009 present even lower volatility for 
the MT and others. This result might be caused by the lower number of observations, since 
data for more MT countries were missing for this period. On average, all the countries 
performed lower volatility than in the longer time framework. Further analysis should state 
whether the data used support the hypothesis, that the lower volatility in IT economies is 
caused by the regime used. 
4.2. The evolution of the output gap 
One of the indicators used to access the monetary policy and as a signal of economic 
activity is the output gap. It shows the distance of the economy from the state of the “full 
employment or potential level” (Billi 2011, 63). The potential level of the product, 
“characterizes aggregate supply (production capacity) of the national economy and 
corresponds to the level of the output for given level of technology and of the output level 
with the full employment of the production factors” (Kadeřábková a Ţďárek 2007, 11). 
The measurements of the output gap might be more difficult to proceed than those of the 
GDP levels, since the potential product is unobservable. 
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The OECD data are limited for the non-OECD countries therefore the evolution of the 
output gap is here illustrated on the sample of inflation targeting countries including Chile, 
Hungary, Mexico and Poland in figure 7. 
Figure 7: Output gap in selected IT economies 
 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
Table 7: Output gap means (ITs) 
Output gap (mean) 
Chile -0.38 Hungary -0.97 Mexico -0.31 Poland -0.42 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
 
The output gap behaved during the time in similar way for those four countries. Main 
problems with bigger negative and positive gaps experienced Mexico, especially in 1995 
and 2000. All countries had significantly negative output gap during the time of the crisis 
and prediction shows possible movements towards the neutral state and later on towards 
the positive output gap. Negative output gap means the situation when the actual output is 
lower than the potential output of the economy. In this case the economy does not exploit 
all its possibilities, whole potential. Literature suggests that for the output gap of the 
positive sign, the inflation pressures in the economy would rise (Kadeřábková a Ţďárek 
2007). To enable the comparison with advanced countries, figure 8 follows. 
Figure 8: Output gap in selected groups of developed countries 
 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
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Table 8: Output gap means (developed) 
Output gap (mean) 
United States -0.5 Euro area -1.1 Total OECD -0.7 
Source: (OECD 2010)  
Although the means of the countries are again of the negative sign, this is probably 
distortion by the data for the crisis period. Usually the values of the output gap for these 
groups of countries were not reaching negative output gap of such a magnitude as the 
selected IT countries did during the 1990´s. The above listed IT countries adopted this 
monetary regime in 1999 (Chile), 2001 (Hungary), 2001 (Mexico), 1999 (Poland) (as listed 
in the table 2). The simple comparison of data shows that the IT countries had more severe 
problems with the volatility of the output gap. That has happened more often and with 
higher level of the output gap than in the developed countries. However while controlling 
for the mean of the average output gap performance of the countries, the output gap is -0.7 
(% of the potential output) for both the group of IT economies and group of the developed 
ones. Figure 8 shows the output gaps in the time of the crisis. 
Assuming the inflation targeting as a “decision making under discretion” (Bernanke and 
Woodford 2005, 20), it would be characterised by precise objective, stabilization of 
inflation around the target and also stabilization of output gap around some target. This 
target is supposed to be modified to equal 0 to be consistent with the natural rate of the 
output level. These actions should “eliminate average inflation bias” (Bernanke and 
Woodford 2005, 20). Therefore the standard deviation could be more predicative than the 
means of the output gap and are presented in table 9. 
Table 9: Output gap – standard deviation (selected IT and advanced countries) 
Output gap (standard deviation)   
  1999-2007 2008-2012 2008-2010 
Chile 1.80 2.28 2.48 
Hungary 0.71 2.96 4.11 
Mexico 2.44 3.09 4.30 
Poland 1.71 1.38 1.88 
mean 1.66 2.43 3.19 
United States 1.09 1.49 2.03 
Euro Area 1.05 1.92 2.68 
Total OECD 0.97 1.78 2.48 
mean 1.04 1.73 2.40 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
The variability of the output gap for selected IT EMEs is higher than for the advanced 
economies and it increased for the crisis period. This is in line with the characteristics of 
the crisis that assume worsening of economic variables. However, the comparison with the 
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emerging non-IT economies is missing since the OECD database does not include data for 
those countries. 
Figure 9: Output gap evolution 2007 - 2010 
 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
The chart illustrates certain countries such as for example Chile and Poland were 
successful in terms of small output gap size. However, those are only two countries against 
the biggest non-targeters.
10
 Inserting the average output gap performance of these IT 
countries for the 2007 – 2010 period into the chart with the developed countries (figure 
10), their overall good performance is demonstrated. 
Figure 10: Output gap observations for the crisis 
 
Source: (OECD 2010) 
  
                                                 
10
 Assuming especially the USA and the Euro area, because the OECD group also contains other developed 
countries performing inflation targeting. Therefore the USA and Euro area can stand here as an opposite 
group in terms of use of other monetary policy than IT.  
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This also nicely illustrates an onset of the crisis in mid 2008 and its peak in 2009. Selected 
IT economies were slightly above the performance of the Euro area and the USA before 
the crisis and remained in this distance until the bottom point in 2009 where the levels 
were nearly equalled for all the groups. However, their recovery went on the same line as 
for the USA and the OECD countries but still performing smaller negative output gap. 
4.3. Real effective exchange rate 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is the index measuring the change in the 
purchasing power of the currency. Usually is the REER determined by the use of the 
weighted geometric mean of the ratio of nominal effective exchange rate in the particular 
country and price indexes of “partner” countries towards the country´s (national) change in 
prices.
11
 The IFS REER data are retrieved from the “relative unit labour costs and relative 
normalized unit labour costs” (IMF 2008, 3). Issues such as the “importance of a country´s 
trading partners in its direct bilateral relations with them (in both home and foreign 
markets), of the competitive relations with third countries in particular markets and of the 
differences among countries in the importance of foreign trade to the manufacturing 
sector” (IMF 2008, 3) are assumed being relevant for the index creation. Therefore can be 
the REER presented as one of the measures of the country´s competitiveness. 
Simply said, the real appreciation of the national currency to the foreign one affects the 
trade while the exporters face more difficult position than importers. The price of exports 
to another country increases and therefore national exporters´ competitiveness decreases. 
In this situation, the imports from the other country are cheaper. This condition applies 
vice versa for depreciation of the national currency to the foreign one (Kadeřábková 2002). 
Therefore in the situation of stronger exchange rate country´s trade balance might be 
lower. Using this assumption, the data for the REER during the crisis can be assessed and 
displayed in the figure 10: Comparison of the IT, non-IT EMEs and the Euro Area.  
  
                                                 
11
 (Kadeřábková 2002, 98); Or: “weighted average of relative prices of a country with its main trade 
competitors” (IMF 2008, 3) 
38 
 
Figure 11: REER for ITs 2007 – 2009, (2005 = 100) 
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
The real effective exchange rate data shows how the countries maintained this crucial 
economic variable through the crisis period. Annual data for 2007 to 2009 were used to 
make the first overlook in the figure 11. 
Figure 12: REER comparison of the IT, non-IT EMEs and the Euro Area, (2005=100)   
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
The real effective exchange rate, as shown in figure 12, changed smoothly for the Euro 
area countries. The non-ITs comparable to our IT countries followed reverse path from the 
2008 when it started to increase sharply. IT economies experienced slightly increasing 
trend with the peak in 2008 than it decreased slowly beneath the Euro Area values.  
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This could be a sign of ability of this regime to perform better outcomes in terms of 
balance of trade during the crisis.  
 
The relevant literature suggests that the inflation targeting outcomes are difficult to assess. 
For example Issing (Issing 2004, 171) says that the inflation targeting is hard to compare 
with another monetary policy regimes since the definition of the IT is not that specific to 
enable the empirical evaluation of its advantages or disadvantages. Demertzis and Viegi 
(Demertzis and Viegi 2008, 57) add to the discussion that the models conventionally used 
for monetary policy description lack the differences for description of the inflation 
targeting and other strategies (Walsh 2009, a).
12
 
The work aims to find the way such a comparison of the monetary policy regimes could be 
done and to point out effects of the inflation targeting. Suitable approach can be the 
difference-in-differences approach to which e.g. the Goncalves and Sales paper applies.  
5. Difference in differences approach 
“Difference-in-differences estimator is the methodology for uncovering the impact of 
specific policy changes or economic shocks on the market outcomes” (Borgas 2005, 64). 
One of the corresponding methods to compare the IT countries to the economies which use 
other monetary policies is the difference-in-difference approach.  Usually the method is 
used for two periods of time and two groups. These groups are a comparison group, the 
non-targeting countries in this case, and a treatment group, the IT economies. The estimate 
of the treatment effect could be defined while taking difference of the outcomes for the 
representatives of the comparison group, as well as of the treatment group, before the 
assigned treatment (inflation targeting regime adoption) and after the treatment. From the 
average change in the outcomes, after treatment values minus before treatment values, of 
the comparison and treatment groups, the difference is taken for another time. This 
procedure should be suitable for the purposes of this work since “the first difference 
removes the offending unobserved heterogeneity and restores conditional independence, 
while the second produces the impact estimates.” (Essama-Nssah 2006, 17)13 
                                                 
12
 There is this no explicit analysis of the way the provision of a specific numerical target may constitute a 
better anchor for private-sector expectations (Walsh 2009, 21, a). 
13
  „the DD method is two-step procedure that relies on differencing to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity stemming from fixed effects, and on averaging to control for observed heterogeneity” (Essama-
Nssah 2006, 19). 
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Regarding the periods of time used, the first one is the period from 1990 to 2005, 2007 
respectively, and the second one is from 2005 (2007) to 2010, or 2009 in dependence on 
the data availability. The 1990 is stated as a benchmark for the IT economies since it is the 
year the first of the countries implemented this policy. According to the theory, the 
comparison group should not be under the treatment, the inflation targeting here, in any of 
those two periods. The treatment group should not be under the treatment in one of those 
periods here it is the first period of 1990 – 2002 and should be under the treatment in the 
other one, here the second period (Ball and Sheridan 2003). 
The difference in differences approach is used to define the regression which should 
deliver the data estimates on variables of the interest and thus enable to assess the impact 
and effects of the inflation targeting on the emerging market economies. Since the 
performance of the IT countries can be evaluated using the behavioural observations of e.g. 
level and variability of the inflation, pace and variability of the GDP etc., these variables 
might be used in the differences regression. As the Ball and Sheridan suggest, the 
regression for these purposes might be stated in following way: 
                   , 
where    is the value of variable of the interest after the inflation targeting, in the second 
period.     is the value of the variable of the interest before the inflation targeting 
implementation, in the first period.   stands here for the dummy variable which takes the 
value of 0 if the country is a non-IT economy and value of 1 if the country is the IT 
economy.   is the error term. 
The data are then used in the OLS regression proceeded in the Gretl software
14
 to obtain 
the outcomes of the model. 
5.1. CPI percentage change in volume estimations 
Using the IMF IFS data for the CPI percentage change with the annual observations, the 
groups of countries were analysed in the so called beginning period, denoted B in the table 
and the chart, and final period, denoted F. C stands here for the change, the final period 
value minus beginning period value. The values of the periods are the annual CPI 
percentage changes in volumes in each country. Regarding the period B, this is the year 
1990 and the F stands for the year 2005. Later on, the data for the final period of 2007 are 
used in the model 2. Data for the following models 1 and 2 are displayed in the table 10. 
                                                 
14
 Software package for econometric analysis, free software, more information: http://gretl.sourceforge.net/. 
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Table 10: CPI % change - model 1 and 2 data 
Country 
Beginning 
1990 
Final 
2005 Change 
Final 
2007 Change 
IT           
Indonesia 7,81 10,45 2,64 6,32 -1,49 
Philippines 12,68 7,63 -5,05 2,83 -9,85 
Thailand 5,86 4,54 -1,32 2,28 -3,59 
Hungary 28,97 3,55 -25,42 7,93 -21,04 
Poland 555,38 2,11 -553,27 2,39 -552,99 
Turkey 60,31 10,14 -50,17 8,76 -51,56 
Ghana 37,26 15,12 -22,14 10,73 -26,53 
South Africa 14,32 3,40 -10,92 7,10 -7,22 
Brazil 2947,73 6,87 
-
2940,86 3,64 
-
2944,09 
Chile 26,03 3,05 -22,98 4,41 -21,62 
Colombia 29,15 5,05 -24,10 5,54 -23,60 
Guatemala 41,22 8,42 -32,80 6,45 -34,77 
Mexico 26,65 3,99 -22,67 3,97 -22,69 
Peru 7481,66 1,62 
-
7480,04 1,78 
-
7479,88 
Uruguay 112,53 4,70 -107,83 8,11 -104,41 
Mean  759,17 6,04 -753,13 5,48 -753,69 
Non-IT           
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 3,06 1,82 -1,24 4,75 1,69 
China,P.R.:Maca
o 7,97 4,40 -3,57 5,57 -2,40 
India 8,97 4,25 -4,72 6,37 -2,60 
Malaysia 2,62 2,96 0,34 2,03 -0,59 
Maldives 3,62 1,30 -2,32 6,79 3,17 
Pakistan 9,05 9,06 0,01 7,60 -1,45 
Bulgaria 23,80 5,04 -18,76 8,40 -15,40 
Kenya 17,78 10,31 -7,47 9,76 -8,02 
Madagascar 11,78 18,51 6,73 10,30 -1,48 
Malawi 11,82 15,41 3,59 7,95 -3,87 
Mauritius 13,49 4,94 -8,55 8,80 -4,69 
Argentina 2313,96 9,64 
-
2304,32 8,83 
-
2305,13 
Dominican 
Republic 50,46 4,19 -46,27 6,14 -44,32 
Haiti 21,28 15,73 -5,55 8,53 -12,75 
Nicaragua 7485,49 9,60 
-
7475,89 11,13 
-
7474,36 
Paraguay 37,26 6,81 -30,45 8,13 -29,13 
Venezuela, Rep. 
Bol. 40,66 15,95 -24,70 18,70 -21,96 
Mean  591,95 8,23 -583,71 8,22 -583,72 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-32, Dependent variable: Change,  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,33042 1,41312 5,8951 <0,00001 *** 
B -1,00017 0,000304054 -3289,4456 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,16093 1,63947 -1,3181 0,19780  
 
Mean dependent var -663,1278  S.D. dependent var  1901,234 
Sum squared resid  659,5996  S.E. of regression  4,769152 
R-squared  0,999994  Adjusted R-squared  0,999994 
F(2, 29)   5571526  P-value(F)  1,05e-81 
Log-likelihood -93,82039  Akaike criterion  193,6408 
Schwarz criterion  198,0380  Hannan-Quinn  195,0983 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 5,20624  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 5,20624) = 0,266783 
 
Model 1 for the data of years 1990 and 2005 show expected negative value of the dummy 
coefficient but it is above the significance levels. The dummy coefficient is of the main 
importance in these models. When significant, the coefficient would show the percentage 
change of the CPI that can be assigned to the inflation targeting regime as its effect. Here it 
would mean 2.2 % decline in CPI for the IT compared to the non-IT EMEs. According to 
the White´s test, the heteroskedasticity is not present since the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-32, Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,27917 0,896643 9,2335 <0,00001 *** 
B -1,0001 0,000317378 -3151,1162 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,72411 1,10908 -2,4562 0,02027 ** 
 
Mean dependent var -663,3944  S.D. dependent var  1901,106 
Sum squared resid  295,3905  S.E. of regression  3,191533 
R-squared  0,999997  Adjusted R-squared  0,999997 
F(2, 29)   4964776  P-value(F)  5,61e-81 
Log-likelihood -80,96703  Akaike criterion  167,9341 
Schwarz criterion  172,3313  Hannan-Quinn  169,3916 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 0,804015  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 0,804015) = 0,937909 
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Model 2 uses data for the years 1990 and 2007 to increase the number of the observations 
included and also to approach the year assumed to be the beginning of the crisis. The 
Model 2 displays coefficient for the dummy D of -2.72411 with the p-value of 0.02027, 
therefore lower than the 0.05 (5%) level of significance. It can be stated that the dummy, 
the being IT country, had an effect of approximately 2.72 % decrease of the CPI over the 
period. There were missing data for few countries in years 1990 – 1995 (inclusive) and the 
data also were influenced by the hyperinflation in some of the countries. Therefore the 
same procedure as presented above is done for the year 1996 as a beginning year and 2005 
(2007) for the final and it can be seen as a robustness check to support previous findings. 
Outcomes of the regressions are represented by the models 3 and 4.  
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-39, Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 6,0223 1,13106 5,3245 <0,00001 *** 
B -0,92792 0,0373048 -24,8740 <0,00001 *** 
D -1,364 1,44723 -0,9425 0,35222  
 
Mean dependent var -16,24896  S.D. dependent var  26,93203 
Sum squared resid  709,6528  S.E. of regression  4,439885 
R-squared  0,974253  Adjusted R-squared  0,972823 
F(2, 36)  369,3735  P-value(F)  1,02e-24 
Log-likelihood -111,9123  Akaike criterion  229,8246 
Schwarz criterion  234,8152  Hannan-Quinn  231,6152 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 9,20109  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 9,20109) = 0,056265 
 
Regarding the model 3, dummy coefficient is not statistically significant but still of the 
expected negative sign. The null hypotheses of the non-presence of the heteroskedasticity 
can be rejected on the 0.10 (10%) significance level. Therefore the estimates might lose 
some of their optimal properties. 
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Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-39, Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 6,87002 0,594558 11,5548 <0,00001 *** 
B -0,946407 0,025992 -36,4115 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,92953 0,8858 -3,3072 0,00214 *** 
 
Mean dependent var -16,55496  S.D. dependent var  27,34034 
Sum squared resid  245,4224  S.E. of regression  2,610994 
R-squared  0,991360  Adjusted R-squared  0,990880 
F(2, 36)  952,4771  P-value(F)  6,75e-32 
Log-likelihood -91,20728  Akaike criterion  188,4146 
Schwarz criterion  193,4052  Hannan-Quinn  190,2052 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 17,7384  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 17,7384) = 0,00138816 
 
Model 4 displays the data for the years 1996 and 2007. The value of the dummy coefficient 
is of the negative sign, which is in accordance with the assumption that the IT regime 
would be lowering the CPI more than other regimes and also highly significant (even on 
the 1% level of significance). However, the null hypothesis for heteroskedasticity can be 
rejected therefore the hypothesis that the heteroskedasticty is not present does not hold.  
The behaviour of the estimates would show whether the effects of the IT is present. The 
coefficient of the dummy should be in this case of the positive value. Since the main 
concern of the monetary policy authority is to maintain positive and stable inflation levels 
rather than to face the problems delivered by the possible deflation, negative levels of 
inflation. 
Taking the values for years 2005 (B2005) and 2009, the model 5 presents following 
information. Low but positive coefficient values are delivered by the model, however the 
coefficient is not significant in this case. Also the null hypothesis can be rejected therefore 
the heteroskedasticity might be present in the model. Data for models 5 and 6 are depicted 
in the following table 11. 
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Table 11: CPI % change - model 5 and 6 data 
Country 
Beginning 
2005 
Final 
2009 Change 
Beginning 
2007 Change 
IT           
Indonesia 10,45 6,39 -4,07 6,32 0,07 
Philippines 7,63 3,23 -4,40 2,83 0,40 
Thailand 4,54 -0,85 -5,39 2,28 -3,13 
Albania 2,37 2,28 -0,09 2,93 -0,65 
Hungary 3,55 4,21 0,66 7,93 -3,73 
Poland 2,11 3,83 1,72 2,39 1,44 
Romania 8,99 5,59 -3,40 4,84 0,75 
Serbia, Republic 
of 16,12 7,78 -8,34 6,39 1,39 
Turkey 10,14 6,25 -3,89 8,76 -2,51 
Ghana 15,12 19,25 4,13 10,73 8,52 
South Africa 3,40 7,13 3,73 7,10 0,03 
Brazil 6,87 4,89 -1,98 3,64 1,25 
Chile 3,05 1,48 -1,57 4,41 -2,93 
Colombia 5,05 4,20 -0,85 5,54 -1,34 
Guatemala 8,42 1,86 -6,56 6,45 -4,60 
Mexico 3,99 5,30 1,31 3,97 1,33 
Peru 1,62 2,94 1,32 1,78 1,16 
Uruguay 4,70 7,10 2,40 8,11 -1,02 
Mean 6,56 5,16 -1,40 5,36 -0,20 
Non-IT           
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 1,82 -0,70 -2,52 4,75 -5,45 
China,P.R.:Macao 4,40 1,17 -3,23 5,57 -4,40 
India 4,25 10,88 6,63 6,37 4,51 
Malaysia 2,96 0,58 -2,38 2,03 -1,44 
Maldives 1,30 4,54 3,24 6,79 -2,25 
Pakistan 9,06 13,65 4,58 7,60 6,05 
Vietnam 8,28 7,05 -1,23 8,30 -1,25 
Bulgaria 5,04 2,75 -2,29 8,40 -5,65 
Latvia 6,74 3,53 -3,22 10,11 -6,58 
Lithuania 2,67 4,45 1,78 5,75 -1,30 
Macedonia, FYR 0,16 -0,27 -0,43 3,61 -3,88 
Kenya 10,31 9,23 -1,08 9,76 -0,52 
Madagascar 18,51 8,96 -9,56 10,30 -1,34 
Malawi 15,41 8,42 -6,99 7,95 0,47 
Mauritius 4,94 2,55 -2,39 8,80 -6,25 
Argentina 9,64 6,27 -3,37 8,83 -2,56 
Dominican 
Republic 4,19 1,44 -2,75 6,14 -4,70 
Haiti 15,73 -0,01 -15,74 8,53 -8,54 
Nicaragua 9,60 3,69 -5,91 11,13 -7,44 
Paraguay 6,81 2,59 -4,22 8,13 -5,54 
Venezuela, Rep. 
Bol. 15,95 28,59 12,63 18,70 9,89 
Mean 7,51 5,68 -1,83 7,98 -2,30 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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Model 5: OLS, using observations 1-39, Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,784839 1,2932 0,6069 0,54773  
B2005 -0,348006 0,241853 -1,4389 0,15881  
D 0,0948009 1,35453 0,0700 0,94459  
 
Mean dependent var -1,633158  S.D. dependent var  4,854173 
Sum squared resid  788,3797  S.E. of regression  4,679683 
R-squared  0,119516  Adjusted R-squared  0,070601 
F(2, 36)  1,125809  P-value(F)  0,335543 
Log-likelihood -113,9638  Akaike criterion  233,9275 
Schwarz criterion  238,9182  Hannan-Quinn  235,7181 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 11,2653  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 11,2653) = 0,0237392 
 
Model 6: OLS, using observations 1-39, Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -5,37066 2,36747 -2,2685 0,02939 ** 
B2007 0,385468 0,318785 1,2092 0,23448  
D 3,10854 1,33571 2,3273 0,02569 ** 
 
Mean dependent var -1,327155  S.D. dependent var  4,005729 
Sum squared resid  517,5465  S.E. of regression  3,791608 
R-squared  0,151205  Adjusted R-squared  0,104050 
F(2, 36)  2,712202  P-value(F)  0,079953 
Log-likelihood -105,7566  Akaike criterion  217,5132 
Schwarz criterion  222,5039  Hannan-Quinn  219,3038 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 12,9658  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 12,9658) = 0,011444 
 
Model 6 delivers the results supporting the hypothesis that the inflation levels were of 
positive values. It shows 3.1% increase in CPI for the IT countries and the outcome is 
significant on the 0.05 (5%) level. However, the possibility of presence of the 
heteroskedasticity exists. Again the null hypothesis can be rejected according to the 
White´s test. 
Both tables 10 and 11 show the data that were used for the composition of the model. 
However, the means of the values present the higher difference between the final and the 
beginning value of the CPI for the IT countries only in the pre-crisis period, table 10. The 
results are very similar for both final years 2005 and 2007. For the purposes of this work, 
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the final year 2007 is more important because it represents the beginning of the crisis 
period. This simple comparison of the CPI % falls needs to be accompanied with the 
regressions presented because the IT data on CPI show higher values in the beginning 
periods than the non-IT countries. Therefore the higher difference between the periods for 
ITs could stand for the “tendency for this variable to revert to its mean” (Goncalvas and 
Salles 2008, 313). 
Table 11 includes 4 more observations for the countries which lack data for the beginning 
year 1990. Use of the beginning year of 2007 (2005 stands here as a comparison for the 
Goncalves et al work, since their observations ended with the year 2005) and final of the 
2009 (2010 was used as well but there were not data available to all countries of the 
sample and in many cases the data were only expected values) underlines the period of the 
financial crisis. The IT regime should help the countries to maintain low and stable 
inflation but at the same time prevent the threat of deflation. Although the data for the fall 
in CPI are again of the negative values for the ITs, they are of smaller magnitude than 
those for the non-ITs and therefore inflation targeting should help with the above described 
maintenance of the CPI more significantly than other regimes.  
Outcomes of the models presented in this section are summarized in the table 12. It 
includes also the results for the models that are not displayed here to enable to evaluate 
why those were omitted. Usually for those models, the fit of the data represented by the R
2
 
values is small (especially model 5 and 6). 
 
Table 12: CPI % change - outcomes of the models  
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
1 
(1990 - 2005) 8,33 <0,00001 -2,1600 0,19780 -1,000 <0,00001 0,99 32 
2 
(1990 - 2007) 8,28 <0,00001 -2,7200 0,02027 -1,000 <0,00001 0,99 32 
3 
(1996 - 2005) 6,02 <0,00001 -1,3640 0,35220 -0,927 <0,00001 0,97 39 
4 
(1996 - 2007) 6,87 <0,00001 -2,9295 0,00214 -0,946 <0,00001 0,99 39 
5 
(2005 - 2009) 0,78 0,54700 0,0948 0,94000 -0,348 0,15800 0,07 39 
6 
(2007 - 2009) -5,37 0,02900 3,1085 0,02569 0,385 0,23400 0,10 39 
                  Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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The models were then also run separately for the categories of the countries. The table 13 
displays the estimates from the regressions for the IT and non-IT countries as categorised 
in table 4 above. 
Table 13: CPI % change - outcomes of the models for the country categories 
Countries category               
Central and Eastern Europe 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
(1995 - 2005) -0,87350 0,70429 2,44870 0,25236 -0,83415 <0,00001 0,98 10 
(1995 - 2007) 5,04352 0,02824 -1,89867 0,27237 -0,94622 <0,00001 0,99 10 
(2005 - 2010) 0,56805 0,57972 3,46820 0,03788 -0,82714 0,00026 0,79 10 
(2007 - 2010) -0,40680 0,84986 4,41247 0,01066 -0,76941 0,04455 0,74 10 
Developing Asia 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
(1990 - 2005) 1,40439 0,34299 1,84550 0,46375 -0,51165 0,11074 0,1 8 
(1990 - 2007) 3,18824 0,14622 -2,25878 0,21159 -0,67230 0,04008 0,64 8 
(2005 - 2010) 2,77008 0,56685 -5,83853 0,06098 -0,12239 0,83588 0,24 8 
(2007 - 2010) 0,69822 0,82659 -1,70852 0,55401 0,19726 0,69836 -0,22 8 
Latin America and Caribbean 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
(1990 - 2005) 10,76130 0,00103 -5,54280 0,02987 -1,00027 <0,00001 0,99 13 
(1990 - 2007) 10,64640 0,00071 -5,43278 0,02438 -1,00024 <0,00001 0,99 13 
(2005 - 2009) -2,75687 0,64135 2,12796 0,37694 -0,04537 0,96131 -0,15 13 
(2007 - 2009) 12,20080 0,01856 7,04446 0,02464 0,88378 0,09706 0,29 13 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
(1990 - 2005) 7,02994 0,25157 -7,66725 0,17058 -0,61628 0,02900 0,59 6 
(1990 - 2007) 7,08671 0,00339 -2,15056 0,01546 -0,84570 0,00002 0,98 6 
(2005 - 2010) -0,38851 0,71992 3,15585 0,01327 -0,49028 0,00240 0,96 6 
(2007 - 2010) -6,85258 0,43647 2,00702 0,39863 0,38323 0,64484 -0,36 6 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
5.1.1. CPI % change – use of averages 
The averages of the periods may by also used to evaluate the effect of the inflation 
targeting. This approach is also used for the GDP percentage change since it could better 
capture the changes over the years than the individual years at the beginning and the end of 
the period. The use of averages in this section can stand for the check of the previous 
results. The beginning period for the IT countries are the values from 1990 to the year of 
IT adoption, X, (inclusive) and for the non-IT the years are 1990 to 2002 (average year of 
adoption among ITs). The final period begins in X + 1 for ITs and 2003 for non-ITs and 
end in 2007. Second model also uses the crisis period of 2008-2010 for both groups. 
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Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-35 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,45355 1,31739 6,4169 <0,00001 *** 
B -0,999924 0,0016864 -592,9342 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,46914 1,40442 -1,7581 0,08829 * 
 
Mean dependent var -85,58526  S.D. dependent var  220,1498 
Sum squared resid  736,2923  S.E. of regression  4,796784 
R-squared  0,999553  Adjusted R-squared  0,999525 
F(2, 32)  193283,3  P-value(F)  4,86e-66 
Log-likelihood -102,9727  Akaike criterion  211,9455 
Schwarz criterion  216,6115  Hannan-Quinn  213,5562 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 6,92535  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 6,92535) = 0,139886 
 
Model 1 deals with the pre-crisis periods from year 1990 to 2007. It shows that using the 
averages of the periods, the decrease in CPI was higher for the IT countries. The 
contribution of the IT regime is visible from the negative value of the dummy coefficient 
which is also significant on 10% level. According to the model 1, the regime helped to 
lower the CPI change by approximately -2.5%. 
Regarding the crisis period, which is than taken as the final (2008-2010) one, it was used in 
regression with the beginning period (2002-2007) which already reflects the inflation 
targeting adoption.  The results are delivered by following model 2. 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-38 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 3,45102 1,55093 2,2251 0,03261 ** 
B -0,339982 0,266972 -1,2735 0,21124  
D -1,60386 0,915649 -1,7516 0,08860 * 
 
Mean dependent var  0,271258  S.D. dependent var  4,100909 
Sum squared resid  520,7826  S.E. of regression  3,857396 
R-squared  0,163060  Adjusted R-squared  0,115235 
F(2, 35)  3,446983  P-value(F)  0,043007 
Log-likelihood -103,6568  Akaike criterion  213,3137 
Schwarz criterion  218,2265  Hannan-Quinn  215,0616 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 28,3562  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 28,3562) = 1,05622e-005 
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The model shows negative values of the dummy coefficient which is significant on the 
10% level. However, for the purposes of the maintenance of the inflation levels during the 
crisis, the positive value would be more plausible as already discussed above. The model 
also show quite low fit with the data, low value of R
2
. 
The volatility of the CPI was also assessed on the average values derived from the above 
described periods. Model 3 derives the pre-crisis values and the model 4 follows with crisis 
observations regression. 
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-39 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 4,20683 1,04397 4,0297 0,00028 *** 
B -1,00081 0,000401489 -2492,7450 <0,00001 *** 
D -1,49372 1,05955 -1,4098 0,16719  
 
Mean dependent var -179,2042  S.D. dependent var  497,4555 
Sum squared resid  447,8123  S.E. of regression  3,526929 
R-squared  0,999952  Adjusted R-squared  0,999950 
F(2, 36)   5384797  P-value(F)  2,72e-99 
Log-likelihood -102,9344  Akaike criterion  211,8689 
Schwarz criterion  216,8596  Hannan-Quinn  213,6595 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 2,12985  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,12985) = 0,711891 
 
Before the crisis, the volatility of the CPI % volume changes was lower for the IT regimes. 
The contribution of the IT according to the model would be the decrease in volatility by -
1.5% the dummy coefficient is not significant on the 10% level. However, the result 
suggests a bigger decrease in CPI volatility for countries using the IT regime. 
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-39 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5,28121 0,89421 5,9060 <0,00001 *** 
B -1,00845 0,13237 -7,6184 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,696 0,891012 -3,0258 0,00456 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0,638973  S.D. dependent var  4,514224 
Sum squared resid  299,6946  S.E. of regression  2,885282 
R-squared  0,612984  Adjusted R-squared  0,591483 
F(2, 36)  31,30522  P-value(F)  1,33e-08 
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Log-likelihood -95,10305  Akaike criterion  196,2061 
Schwarz criterion  201,1968  Hannan-Quinn  197,9967 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 8,63529  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 8,63529) = 0,0708909 
 
For the period of the crisis, the change for the ITs should be according to the results of the 
model 4, bigger than in the pre-crisis period. On the 1% level of significance, the model 
shows the negative value of dummy coefficient. It means a reduction of -2.7% in CPI% 
changes in volume for the IT countries. Therefore the volatility in the IT countries should 
have been lower than in non-IT countries. 
5.2. GDP deflator estimations 
As another measure of the inflation in the economy the GDP deflator can be used. “The 
GDP deflator reflects movements of hundreds of separate deflators for the individual 
expenditure components of GDP. These components include expenditure on such items as 
“bread, investment in computers, imports of aircraft, and exports of consultancy services” 
(HM Treasury 2010). The deflator should be the suitable aggregate expression of the 
inflation (Kadeřábková 2002, 113) and therefore is also assumed in this work. Again data 
for the beginning and final periods are collected, changes are determined and used in the 
difference-in-differences regression introduced above. 
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Following table 14 shows the data for the models 1 and 2 of the GDP deflator estimations. 
Table 14: GDP deflator - model 1 and 2 data 
Country 
Beginning 
1980 
Final 
2005 Change 
Final 
2007 Change 
IT           
Brazil 91,22 7,21 -84,01 5,88 -85,34 
Chile 29,26 7,55 -21,70 5,45 -23,80 
Colombia 27,61 5,56 -22,05 5,04 -22,58 
Guatemala 10,03 5,63 -4,39 7,14 -2,89 
Hungary 5,45 2,28 -3,17 5,89 0,44 
Indonesia 29,15 14,33 -14,81 11,26 -17,89 
Mexico 34,52 4,29 -30,24 5,60 -28,92 
Peru 59,95 3,32 -56,63 2,19 -57,76 
Philippines 6,56 6,02 -0,54 2,52 -4,04 
South Africa 24,92 6,95 -17,97 8,06 -16,86 
Thailand 13,13 4,56 -8,57 3,55 -9,58 
Uruguay 50,95 5,08 -45,87 9,74 -41,21 
Mean 31,89 6,06 -25,83 6,03 -25,87 
Non-IT           
Argentina 165,59 8,84 -156,75 14,25 -151,34 
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 4,10 4,55 0,45 4,78 0,68 
Dominican 
Republic 13,70 2,69 -11,01 5,70 -8,00 
Haiti 15,24 17,59 2,35 n.a. n.a. 
India 11,56 4,71 -6,84 5,47 -6,09 
Kenya 8,60 6,28 -2,32 n.a. n.a. 
Madagascar 14,99 18,32 3,33 9,61 -5,37 
Malawi 16,70 11,27 -5,44 n.a. n.a. 
Mauritius 26,57 4,26 -22,31 8,18 -18,39 
Pakistan 10,53 7,03 -3,50 7,65 -2,87 
Paraguay 16,92 8,10 -8,81 10,23 -6,69 
Venezuela, 
Rep. Bol. 24,85 29,60 4,76 13,90 -10,95 
Mean 27,44 10,27 -17,17 8,86 -23,22 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-24, Dependent variable: Change  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 10,1612 2,53463 4,0089 0,00064 *** 
B1980 -0,996032 0,0152023 -65,5186 <0,00001 *** 
D -4,22317 2,47061 -1,7094 0,10212  
 
Mean dependent var -21,50248  S.D. dependent var  35,62514 
Sum squared resid  784,2905  S.E. of regression  6,111233 
R-squared  0,973132  Adjusted R-squared  0,970573 
F(2, 21)  2397,917  P-value(F)  1,64e-25 
Log-likelihood -75,89523  Akaike criterion  157,7905 
Schwarz criterion  161,3246  Hannan-Quinn  158,7281 
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White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 6,47882  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 6,47882) = 0,16613 
 
Model number 1 for the GDP deflator data uses beginning year 1980 and final year 2005. 
The coefficient of the dummy for the IT regime is of the negative sign, which signals for 
the advantages of the monetary policy, however, the 10% significance level was exceeded 
for 0.2%.  
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-21 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 7,73012 1,08329 7,1358 <0,00001 *** 
B1980 -0,964677 0,0105318 -91,5964 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,83082 1,23736 -2,2878 0,03447 ** 
 
Mean dependent var -24,73570  S.D. dependent var  35,81004 
Sum squared resid  144,0469  S.E. of regression  2,828888 
R-squared  0,994384  Adjusted R-squared  0,993759 
F(2, 18)  5236,208  P-value(F)  1,29e-25 
Log-likelihood -50,01668  Akaike criterion  106,0334 
Schwarz criterion  109,1669  Hannan-Quinn  106,7134 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 2,94719  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,94719) = 0,566701 
 
In the model 2, final year 2007 is presented and the dummy coefficient is significant, 
according to the p-value on the 5% level. The IT regime works for the countries which 
adopted it.  
The same procedure is completed in the models 3 and 4 where the beginning year changes 
to 1990, the final years are 2005 and 2007 respectively. Using another beginning year, the 
1990, works as a robustness check for the regression outcomes. 
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-29 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 9,76421 2,03551 4,7969 0,00006 *** 
B1990 -1,00048 0,000277384 -3606,8276 <0,00001 *** 
D -3,16737 2,1732 -1,4575 0,15696  
 
Mean dependent var -381,0375  S.D. dependent var  1143,249 
Sum squared resid  858,2535  S.E. of regression  5,745411 
R-squared  0,999977  Adjusted R-squared  0,999975 
F(2, 26)   6546599  P-value(F)  7,47e-75 
Log-likelihood -90,26947  Akaike criterion  186,5389 
Schwarz criterion  190,6408  Hannan-Quinn  187,8236 
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White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 2,8984  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,8984) = 0,574969 
 
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-26 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,63085 1,0368 8,3245 <0,00001 *** 
B1990 -1,00037 0,000540986 -1849,1588 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,0063 1,42061 -1,4123 0,17126  
 
Mean dependent var -425,4395  S.D. dependent var  1201,599 
Sum squared resid  248,1165  S.E. of regression  3,284459 
R-squared  0,999993  Adjusted R-squared  0,999993 
F(2, 23)   2238933  P-value(F)  1,49e-61 
Log-likelihood -66,21783  Akaike criterion  138,4357 
Schwarz criterion  142,2099  Hannan-Quinn  139,5225 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 7,2655  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 7,2655) = 0,122505 
 
The models 3 and 4 do not present significantly different outcomes while compared to the 
models 1 and 2. Again, the coefficient is of the negative sign as expected. However, the 
10% level of statistical significance of the coefficient of the main variable of the interest, 
dummy D, is again slightly exceeded. This can be caused by the relatively low number of 
observations presented. Same regressions are done for the period of the crisis in the models 
5 and 6. Data for the models 5 and 6 are presented in the table 15. 
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Table 15: GDP deflator - model 5 and 6 data 
Country 
Beginning 
2005 
Final 
2009 Change 
Beginning 
2007 Change 
IT           
Brazil 7,21 4,80 -2,41 5,88 -1,08 
Chile 7,55 4,20 -3,35 5,45 -1,25 
Colombia 5,56 4,30 -1,26 5,04 -0,74 
Guatemala 5,63 2,36 -3,28 7,14 -4,78 
Hungary 2,28 4,37 2,09 5,89 -1,52 
Indonesia 14,33 8,44 -5,89 11,26 -2,82 
Mexico 4,29 3,91 -0,38 5,60 -1,69 
Peru 3,32 1,43 -1,89 2,19 -0,76 
Philippines 6,02 -0,36 -6,38 2,52 -2,88 
Poland 2,64 3,24 0,59 3,96 -0,72 
Romania 12,18 2,79 -9,40 13,58 -10,79 
South Africa 6,95 7,16 0,21 8,06 -0,90 
Thailand 4,56 2,02 -2,54 3,55 -1,53 
Turkey 7,08 5,15 -1,93 6,22 -1,07 
Uruguay 5,08 5,85 0,78 9,74 -3,89 
Mean 6,31 3,98 -2,34 6,40 -2,43 
Non-IT 
   
    
Argentina 8,84 9,62 0,78 14,25 -4,63 
Bulgaria 7,50 4,14 -3,36 9,47 -5,33 
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 4,55 0,41 -4,14 4,78 -4,36 
China,P.R.:Macao 4,86 -3,70 -8,55 4,85 -8,55 
Dominican 
Republic 2,69 2,95 0,26 5,70 -2,75 
India 4,71 4,46 -0,25 5,47 -1,01 
Latvia 10,17 -1,50 -11,67 20,29 -21,79 
Lithuania 6,61 -3,71 -10,32 8,50 -12,21 
Madagascar 18,32 8,55 -9,77 9,61 -1,06 
Mauritius 4,26 2,68 -1,58 8,18 -5,50 
Nicaragua 9,87 4,86 -5,00 9,04 -4,17 
Pakistan 7,03 20,01 12,99 7,65 12,36 
Paraguay 8,10 -0,12 -8,22 10,23 -10,35 
Vietnam 8,19 6,03 -2,16 8,24 -2,21 
Mean 7,55 3,91 -3,64 9,02 -5,11 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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Model 5: OLS, using observations 1-29 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 1,11442 2,02201 0,5511 0,58624  
B2005 -0,630081 0,121754 -5,1750 0,00002 *** 
D 0,526707 1,74909 0,3011 0,76571  
 
Mean dependent var -2,966994  S.D. dependent var  4,877132 
Sum squared resid  518,2505  S.E. of regression  4,464606 
R-squared  0,221869  Adjusted R-squared  0,162013 
F(2, 26)  15,67227  P-value(F)  0,000034 
Log-likelihood -82,95508  Akaike criterion  171,9102 
Schwarz criterion  176,0120  Hannan-Quinn  173,1948 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 3,68787  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 3,68787) = 0,449893 
  
Model 5 with the data from the years 2005 and 2009 does not show significance for the 
dummy coefficient and even the fit of the data is according to the low R
2
 limited. However, 
the dummy is of a positive sign as expected for the crisis period. Similar outcome is shown 
in the model 6 for years 2007 and 2009. Again the significance of the dummy is not 
present to support the evidence that the IT regime had been important for the countries in 
terms of maintaining low, but still positive, and stable inflation during the crisis using the 
GDP deflator data. 
 
Model 6: OLS, using observations 1-29 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 2,57649 3,03382 0,8493 0,40349  
B2007 -0,852437 0,286687 -2,9734 0,00628 *** 
D 0,454666 1,90963 0,2381 0,81368  
 
Mean dependent var -3,723756  S.D. dependent var  5,575488 
Sum squared resid  557,0972  S.E. of regression  4,628911 
R-squared  0,359960  Adjusted R-squared  0,310726 
F(2, 26)  5,497036  P-value(F)  0,010208 
Log-likelihood -84,00315  Akaike criterion  174,0063 
Schwarz criterion  178,1082  Hannan-Quinn  175,2910 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 3,11544  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 3,11544) = 0,538697 
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The differences in the means of the GDP deflator falls behave in the similar way as the 
results of the regression suggest. For the pre-crisis period the change for the IT countries is 
more significant and this fact was also supported by the outcomes of the model 1 and 2. 
The usefulness of the IT regime for the period crisis was not highlighted by the models 5 
and 6 in terms of the dummy significance but they showed the expected positive values. 
Data in the table 16 also show small difference between the falls in GDP deflator during 
this time framework, especially for the change 2009-2005. The GDP deflator 
measurements are summarized in the table 16. 
 
Table 16: GDP deflator - outcomes of the models 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 observ. 
1 
10,1612 0,00064 -4,22317 0,10212 -0,99603 <0,00001 0,97 24 (1980 - 2005) 
2 
7,73012 <0,00001 -2,83082 0,03447 -0,96468 <0,00001 0,99 21 (1980 - 2007) 
3 
9,7642 0,00006 -3,16737 0,15696 -1,00048 <0,00001 0,99 29 (1990 - 2005) 
4 
8,63085 <0,00001 -2,0063 0,17126 -1,00037 <0,00001 0,99 26 (1990 - 2007) 
5 
1,11442 0,58624 0,526707 0,76571 -0,63008 0,00002 0,16 29 (2005 - 2009) 
6 
2,57649 0,40349 0,454666 0,81368 -0,85244 0,00628 0,31 29 (2007 - 2009) 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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5.3. GDP percentage change in volume estimations 
Possible effects of the inflation targeting are also analysed in terms of the GDP. Using the 
GDP percentage change data from the IMF statistics again the difference-in-difference 
regressions are run in this section to evaluate the behaviour of the data. 
Models 1 and 2 use data starting in 1980, to enlarge the range of the time assessed. 
However, the year 1980 lacks few observations for the selected countries and therefore is 
the sample smaller than in later models. Table 17 shows the data for models 1 and 2. 
Table 17: GDP % change in volume - model 1 and 2 data 
Country 
Beginning 
1980 
Final 
2005 Change 
Final 
2007 Change 
IT           
Hungary 0,21 3,17 2,95 0,77 0,56 
Turkey -2,44 8,40 10,85 4,67 7,11 
Philippines 5,15 5,40 0,25 7,53 2,38 
Thailand 4,78 4,46 -0,32 4,93 0,15 
Brazil 9,23 3,16 -6,07 6,08 -3,15 
Chile 7,73 5,56 -2,17 4,60 -3,13 
Guatemala 3,74 3,26 -0,48 6,30 2,56 
Mexico 8,32 3,28 -5,05 3,36 -4,96 
Peru 7,66 6,45 -1,21 8,69 1,03 
Uruguay 6,00 6,62 0,62 7,46 1,46 
South Africa 6,62 5,28 -1,34 5,57 -1,05 
Indonesia 9,88 5,69 -4,19 6,35 -3,54 
Mean 5,57 5,06 -0,51 5,53 -0,05 
Non-IT           
Honduras 0,69 6,05 5,36 6,31 5,61 
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 7,81 11,31 3,50 14,16 6,36 
India 6,62 9,49 2,87 9,22 2,61 
Malaysia 7,44 5,33 -2,11 6,48 -0,96 
Pakistan 8,70 7,67 -1,03 5,68 -3,02 
Argentina 1,45 9,18 7,72 8,66 7,20 
Bolivia 0,57 4,42 3,86 4,56 4,00 
Dominican 
Republic 6,05 9,26 3,21 8,47 2,42 
Haiti 7,22 1,79 -5,42      n.a.   
Paraguay 11,71 2,86 -8,85 6,76 -4,95 
Venezuela, 
Rep. Bol. -1,99 10,32 12,31 8,40 10,39 
Malawi -0,38 2,57 2,95 5,76 6,14 
Madagascar 0,81 4,59 3,79 6,24 5,44 
Mauritius -10,06 1,24 11,30 5,52 15,58 
Kenya 3,97 5,72 1,75      n.a.   
Mean 3,37 6,12 2,75 7,40 4,37 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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The data presented in the table 17 suggest that the changes in GDP volume were smaller 
and even of negative sign for the IT countries in both models. On the other hand, the non-
IT countries performed bigger percentage changes in GDP volume in both periods. The IT 
countries begun with higher GDP % change values in 1980 than non-ITs but the values for 
2007 show that the ITs remain almost at the same level but the non-ITs increased the 
values for approximately 4%. This might be the fact that the IT countries sample 
performed slower growth than the non-IT in these periods. However, the values of separate 
years may not be appropriate for this case since they could reflect certain extremes or 
different position in the business cycle of the particular country. Therefore the analysis of 
average values of two periods follows after the models of this part. 
 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-27 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5,84762 0,988949 5,9130 <0,00001 *** 
Beginning_1980 -0,919258 0,154339 -5,9561 <0,00001 *** 
D -1,23699 1,08356 -1,1416 0,26488  
 
Mean dependent var  1,297648  S.D. dependent var  5,270143 
Sum squared resid  175,9828  S.E. of regression  2,707880 
R-squared  0,756302  Adjusted R-squared  0,735994 
F(2, 24)  26,01207  P-value(F)  9,80e-07 
Log-likelihood -63,61775  Akaike criterion  133,2355 
Schwarz criterion  137,1230  Hannan-Quinn  134,3915 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 9,86636  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 9,86636) = 0,04274 
Model 1 includes 27 observations, the beginning year is 1980 and the final is 2005. The 
dummy for the inflation targeting is not significant and the heteroskedasticity might be 
present. The imperfections could be the result of small number of observations. It should 
be also stated that the sample starting at 1980 might not be strong enough since the average 
year of the IT adoption for the selected EMEs is 2002. Therefore the 3 years of 
observations might not be enough to reflect the changes caused by the IT regime. 
Model 2, with the same starting year but final year 2007, on the other hand show 
significance of the dummy of the interest, although it lacks additional 2 observations. This 
would mean that the IT presence lowers the GDP percentage change by 2.3%.   
  
60 
 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-25 Dependent variable: Change  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 6,88255 0,547289 12,5757 <0,00001 *** 
Beginning_1980 -0,828346 0,0908804 -9,1147 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,3128 1,01847 -2,2708 0,03329 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  2,250021  S.D. dependent var  5,011085 
Sum squared resid  106,3186  S.E. of regression  2,198332 
R-squared  0,823585  Adjusted R-squared  0,807548 
F(2, 22)  114,0815  P-value(F)  2,43e-12 
Log-likelihood -53,56802  Akaike criterion  113,1360 
Schwarz criterion  116,7927  Hannan-Quinn  114,1502 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 3,08434  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 3,08434) = 0,543811 
 
Models 3 and 4 have the beginning year 1990 and final year 2005 and 2007 respectively. 
The model 3 is not presented here since it again did not deliver significant values for the 
dummy and therefore the effect of the IT would be difficult to evaluate. The results of the 
model 3 are included in the table 19 together with the results of other models of this 
section. The non-significance here might be present due to the facts that are discussed 
below, the different speed of convergence. 
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-31 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,36555 1,03321 8,0967 <0,00001 *** 
Beginning_1990 -0,938967 0,122248 -7,6809 <0,00001 *** 
D -2,47346 1,2714 -1,9455 0,06182 * 
 
Mean dependent var  5,117694  S.D. dependent var  6,400852 
Sum squared resid  466,5039  S.E. of regression  4,081771 
R-squared  0,620459  Adjusted R-squared  0,593349 
F(2, 28)  80,26626  P-value(F)  2,54e-12 
Log-likelihood -86,01192  Akaike criterion  178,0238 
Schwarz criterion  182,3258  Hannan-Quinn  179,4262 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 4,16708  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 4,16708) = 0,383866 
 
Following table 18 presents the data for the models 5 and 6 which did not deliver 
significant values of the IT dummy coefficient either. As already stated, the models did not 
suggest the IT effect in this case.  
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Table 18: GDP % change in volume - model 5 and 6 data 
Country 
Beginning 
2005 
Final 
2009 Change 
Beginning 
2007 Change 
IT           
Hungary 3,17 -6,69 -9,86 0,77 -7,47 
Poland 3,62 2,05 -1,57 6,79 -4,74 
Romania 4,12 -7,13 -11,26 6,27 -13,40 
Turkey 8,40 -4,69 -13,09 4,67 -9,36 
Philippines 5,40 4,01 -1,39 7,53 -3,52 
Thailand 4,46 -2,25 -6,71 4,93 -7,18 
Brazil 3,16 -0,19 -3,35 6,08 -6,27 
Chile 5,56 -1,53 -7,09 4,60 -6,13 
Guatemala 3,26 0,57 -2,69 6,30 -5,73 
Mexico 3,28 -6,01 -9,28 3,36 -9,37 
Peru 6,45 0,88 -5,57 8,69 -7,82 
Uruguay 6,62 2,86 -3,77 7,46 -4,60 
South Africa 5,28 -1,68 -6,96 5,57 -7,25 
Indonesia 5,69 4,55 -1,15 6,35 -1,80 
Mean 4,89 -1,09 -5,98 5,67 -6,76 
Non-IT           
Bulgaria 6,25 -5,03 -11,27 6,17 -11,19 
Latvia 10,60 -17,96 -28,56 9,98 -27,93 
Lithuania 7,80 -14,74 -22,54 9,84 -24,58 
Honduras 6,05 -2,07 -8,12 6,31 -8,38 
China,P.R.: 
Mainland 11,31 9,11 -2,20 14,16 -5,05 
China,P.R.:Macao 6,92 1,33 -5,59 25,99 -24,66 
India 9,49 7,44 -2,05 9,22 -1,79 
Malaysia 5,33 -1,71 -7,05 6,48 -8,19 
Pakistan 7,67 3,63 -4,04 5,68 -2,05 
Vietnam 8,44 5,32 -3,12 8,46 -3,13 
Argentina 9,18 0,65 -8,53 8,66 -8,01 
Dominican 
Republic 9,26 3,45 -5,81 8,47 -5,02 
Nicaragua 4,28 -1,45 -5,73 3,08 -4,53 
Paraguay 2,86 -3,84 -6,70 6,76 -10,61 
Malawi 2,57 7,54 4,97 5,76 1,78 
Madagascar 4,59 -4,57 -9,16 6,24 -10,81 
Mauritius 1,24 1,67 0,43 5,52 -3,85 
Mean 6,70 -0,66 -7,36 8,63 -9,29 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
No evidence is delivered for the effects of the IT during the crisis period. In the model 5 
with the beginning year 2005 and final year 2009 the fit of the data, according to the R
2
, 
was very low.
 
Model 5 is therefore introduced only as a summary in table 20. Dummy 
coefficient in the model 6 (beginning = 2007 and final = 2009) was positive, but very low 
and again insignificant with possible presence of the heteroskedasticity. 
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Model 6: OLS, using observations 1-31 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -2,78352 1,97686 -1,4080 0,17012  
Beginning_2007 -0,754063 0,181255 -4,1602 0,00027 *** 
D 0,299587 1,96422 0,1525 0,87987  
 
Mean dependent var -8,149435  S.D. dependent var  6,686643 
Sum squared resid  1025,514  S.E. of regression  6,051900 
R-squared  0,235453  Adjusted R-squared  0,180843 
F(2, 28)  8,653790  P-value(F)  0,001185 
Log-likelihood -98,22100  Akaike criterion  202,4420 
Schwarz criterion  206,7440  Hannan-Quinn  203,8443 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 10,1467  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 10,1467) = 0,038028 
 
All models from this section are summarized in the table 19. 
Table 19: Summary of the models for GDP % change data 
model constant p-value dummy D p-value begin. B p-value R2 obs. 
1 (1980-2005) 5,8476 <0,00001 -1,2370 0,26488 -0,9193 <0,00001 0,74 27 
2 (1980-2007) 6,8826 <0,00001 -2,3128 0,03329 -0,8283 <0,00001 0,81 25 
3 (1990-2005) 6,2483 <0,00001 -0,8219 0,41784 -0,9825 <0,00001 0,75 33 
4 (1990-2007) 8,3656 <0,00001 -2,4735 0,06182 -0,9390 <0,00001 0,59 31 
5 (2005-2009) -1,1305 0,73740 -0,3027 0,86659 -0,9297 0,13908 0,07 31 
6 (2007-2009) -2,7835 0,17012 0,2996 0,87987 -0,7541 0,00027 0,18 31 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
5.3.1. GDP % change – use of averages 
Against the expectations that the IT would not influence GDP in terms of lower growth
15
, 
these values for different years show negative effect on GDP percentage change in volume. 
However, changes in GDP volume are influenced by many factors e.g. different position in 
the business cycle at the time of measurements, characteristics different from the monetary 
policy used, speed of convergence of particular countries etc.  To ensure that the individual 
years used do not stay for extremes of values achieved, e.g. because of the mentioned 
position in the business cycle etc. the averages of the periods pre- and after-adoption of IT 
are presented in this section. These averages were used to run the regressions for GDP 
percentage change. To capture the effect of the IT, the periods for the targeters and non-
targeters were chosen in the following way. Beginning period starts in the year 1990 for 
                                                 
15
 “Economic theory and evidence both support the idea that low and stable inflation promotes economic 
growth and efficiency...inflation targeting can help an environment  in which the economy can prosper” 
(Bernanke a et.al 1999, 297-298). 
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both groups and ends in the year X, X is the year of adoption of the framework, for the IT 
countries and in the year 2002, since this is the average year of adoption of the regime, for 
non-IT countries. Final period starts in the year X + 1 for ITs and 2003 for the non-ITs and 
it ends in the year 2007, so the influence of the crisis is minimised. The model for these 
periods follows. 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-36 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5,99172 0,957776 6,2559 <0,00001 *** 
B -0,709086 0,191386 -3,7050 0,00077 *** 
D -2,10108 0,881911 -2,3824 0,02312 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  2,993298  S.D. dependent var  3,514759 
Sum squared resid  278,5417  S.E. of regression  2,905281 
R-squared  0,355785  Adjusted R-squared  0,316741 
F(2, 33)  10,74677  P-value(F)  0,000255 
Log-likelihood -87,91067  Akaike criterion  181,8213 
Schwarz criterion  186,5719  Hannan-Quinn  183,4794 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 2,28189  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 2,28189) = 0,684069 
 
The model for the averages shows results of negative values of dummy variable significant 
on the 5 percent level. This would mean relatively high costs of inflation reduction among 
the IT countries in terms of the lower GDP percentage volume changes (-2.1%), decrease 
in the growth speed. However, the variety of issues which might have contributed to this 
evolution of the GDP changes in the IT EMEs and their non-IT counterparts could be 
present and therefore influence the outcomes of the regressions. For example in the section 
3.2.4, the GDP p.c. USD data present the development over the period 1980 to 2007 and 
the positive change for the IT countries was 4,201.23 USD while the non-ITs performed 
change of 2,183.59 USD. The countries begun with approximately same values of GDP 
p.c. USD in 1980, therefore the faster convergence of the IT countries to the advanced 
economies is present. These issues may be the explanation of lower GDP changes in 
volume as the regressions suggest, since the IT countries could have already reach the 
higher convergence state and therefore later on grow on the lower level than the non-ITs, 
so the GDP percentage changes would be lower. This would be a state of the beta 
convergence, which “occurs when less developed economies (with lower GDP per capita) 
tend to grow faster than more developed ones (with higher GDP per capita)” (Rapacki a 
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Prochniak 2009). Assuming the mean values of the GDP % change, the observations from 
1990 to 2010 showed average values of 0.72% for the IT countries and 1.92% for the non-
IT countries. Respective tables are included in the Annex 6.  
To assess the volatility of the GDP, the regression is also run for the standard deviations of 
the variable using similar system of averages of periods shown above. This time the 
beginning period is 1990-2001 for both groups of countries and the final period is 2001-
2007 again for the both groups. Resulting model follows. 
 
Model (Standard deviation of GDP % change averages): OLS, using observations 1-36 
Dependent variable: Change Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 3,24643 0,776089 4,1831 0,00020 *** 
B -0,972293 0,111978 -8,6829 <0,00001 *** 
D -1,20907 0,746179 -1,6203 0,11468  
 
Mean dependent var -1,401685  S.D. dependent var  3,398563 
Sum squared resid  193,6797  S.E. of regression  2,422619 
R-squared  0,520901  Adjusted R-squared  0,491864 
F(2, 33)  39,53895  P-value(F)  1,73e-09 
Log-likelihood -81,37015  Akaike criterion  168,7403 
Schwarz criterion  173,4909  Hannan-Quinn  170,3984 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 6,14201  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 6,14201) = 0,188791 
 
The model implies that there was the reduction in the volatility of the variable by -1.2% 
although not significant on the 10% level. However, the result of lower volatility is in line 
with the findings from the previous sections that the IT regime performed lower volatility 
of GDP in both periods 1980-2009 and 2002-2009 then the respective non-IT countries. 
The volatility changed in following ways for individual countries. 
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Figure 13: IT countries, std. dev. GDP % change in volume, B(1990-2001), F(2001-
2007) 
 
Figure 14: non-IT countries, std. dev. GDP % change in volume, B(1990-2001), 
F(2001-2007) 
 
 
The figures 13 and 14 depict the performance of the individual countries in terms of GDP 
volatility. The IT countries lowered the average volatility after the IT adoption. However, 
some countries have not improved in terms of lower standard deviation the extreme case 
here is Uruguay. Also Colombia and Guatemala showed lower values in the period prior 
the adoption. Regarding the non-IT countries, the differences between the periods are very 
small. The average standard deviation change was -0.91% for ITs and -0.22% for non-ITs. 
This would again support the outcomes of the model presented above. 
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The values for the crisis were different since the volatility increased for both groups. 
However, the non-ITs performed an increase of 4.55% in terms of standard deviation and 
ITs performed increase of 3.82%. This shows the lower volatility of GDP in the crisis 
period for the ITs and could be a cause of the IT regime effect.   
5.4. GDP per capita (current U.S. dollars) estimations 
With the intention to compare the different monetary policy regimes, the GDP p.c. USD 
was also used for the estimations. However, it should be seen as another possibility to 
check previous results and the weight given to these observations should be lower than to 
other section outcomes. This is due to the possible complications which might occur from 
the changes of the exchange rate between national currency and USD. 
Using the World Bank data on the GDP per capita denoted in current U.S. dollars the 
regressions are run for the same years as were run in the section 3.2.3 for the GDP 
percentage volume change. Following table 20 shows data for the model 1 and 2. 
Table 20: GDP per capita (USD) – model 1 and 2 
Country 
Beginning 
1980 
Final 
2005 Change 
Final 
2007 Change 
IT           
Brazil 1932,48 4741,03 2808,55 7184,84 5252,37 
Chile 2465,92 7255,69 4789,78 9877,01 7411,09 
Colombia 1242,09 3405,61 2163,52 4674,60 3432,51 
Ghana 403,15 489,17 86,02 1077,02 673,87 
Guatemala 1123,01 2140,99 1017,98 2554,57 1431,56 
Hungary 2069,90 10924,45 8854,55 13798,75 11728,85 
Indonesia 532,22 1304,08 771,87 1923,29 1391,08 
Mexico 2876,38 8235,08 5358,70 9741,43 6865,05 
Peru 1192,33 2851,89 1659,57 3770,54 2578,21 
Philippines 674,48 1155,89 481,41 1623,91 949,43 
South 
Africa 2926,83 5234,58 2307,75 5932,82 3006,00 
Thailand 684,53 2674,20 1989,67 3689,37 3004,84 
Turkey 1490,19 6786,38 5296,18 8864,69 7374,49 
Uruguay  3488,12 5252,37 1764,25 7205,96 3717,84 
Mean 1650,12 4460,82 2810,70 5851,34 4201,23 
Non-IT           
Argentina  2733,62 4729,82 1996,19 6603,85 3870,23 
Kenya  446,78 523,16 76,38 719,55 272,77 
Madagascar  469,77 286,05 -183,72 394,68 -75,10 
Malawi  199,15 201,80 2,65 239,51 40,36 
Nigeria  861,50 796,78 -64,73 1123,20 261,69 
Uganda  98,35 313,60 215,25 388,16 289,82 
Zambia  672,64 609,69 -62,95 926,60 253,96 
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Dominican 
Rep.  1118,81 3566,82 2448,01 4209,90 3091,10 
India  267,41 761,97 494,56 1104,59 837,18 
Pakistan  286,35 703,59 417,24 880,56 594,21 
Bahrain  8855,12 18500,16 9645,04 24320,79 15465,67 
Bolivia  847,18 1039,98 192,80 1377,51 530,34 
Bulgaria  2261,30 3733,21 1471,92 5498,04 3236,74 
China  193,02 1731,13 1538,10 2651,26 2458,24 
Ecuador  1494,25 2846,85 1352,60 3432,02 1937,77 
Mauritius  1176,55 5054,36 3877,81 5965,96 4789,41 
Nicaragua  659,69 893,26 233,58 1004,13 344,44 
Venezuela, 
RB,  4448,62 5481,30 1032,68 8252,05 3803,43 
Zimbabwe  917,13 447,56 -469,57 403,10 -514,04 
Mean 1474,06 2748,48 1274,41 3657,65 2183,59 
Source: (The World Bank 2011) 
Data in the table 20 express that the mean values of the variable were very similar in the 
beginning year. However, between the 1980 and 2005, the IT countries performed positive 
average change of 2810.7 USD per capita while the non-ITs performed for the same period 
the average change of only 1274.4 USD per capita. However, this can imply possible 
deppreciation of the ER to USD. Therefore might be better to express the changes in terms 
of percentage points. The IT showed in the first period (1980-2007) increase by 
approximately 254% and the respective non-ITs showed 148% increase in GDP p.c. USD.  
Using the 2007 as a final year, the difference between IT and non-IT is even more 
significant. 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-33 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -142,806 299,581 -0,4767 0,63704  
Beginning_1980 0,961436 0,17436 5,5141 <0,00001 *** 
D 1367,02 651,58 2,0980 0,04443 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  1926,171  S.D. dependent var  2446,695 
Sum squared resid  88398156  S.E. of regression  1716,568 
R-squared  0,538540  Adjusted R-squared  0,507776 
F(2, 30)  17,69290  P-value(F)  8,41e-06 
Log-likelihood -291,0391  Akaike criterion  588,0781 
Schwarz criterion  592,5677  Hannan-Quinn  589,5887 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 5,04616  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 5,04616) = 0,282594 
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Model 1 (beginning year 1980, final year 2005) depicts the positive value of the variable of 
the interest, the dummy variable, and the result is significant on the 5% level.  
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-33 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -164,545 370,406 -0,4442 0,66006  
Beginning_1980 1,59297 0,200642 7,9393 <0,00001 *** 
D 1737,19 802,092 2,1658 0,03840 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  3039,557  S.D. dependent var  3516,828 
Sum squared resid  1,32e+08  S.E. of regression  2097,507 
R-squared  0,666515  Adjusted R-squared  0,644283 
F(2, 30)  32,65705  P-value(F)  2,95e-08 
Log-likelihood -297,6530  Akaike criterion  601,3060 
Schwarz criterion  605,7956  Hannan-Quinn  602,8166 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 5,80097  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 5,80097) = 0,214514 
 
Using the final year 2007 data (beginning year remaining 1980), the model 2 delivers 
results similar to the model 1. The coefficient for the dummy is higher in this case.  
Regarding the pre-crisis and crisis period (again, the year 2005 is used hear as a benchmark 
to Goncalves and Salves paper that ends by the year 2005 and concludes that the IT helped 
to the countries to perform better) following table 21 shows the data of the models 3 and 4. 
Using the beginning year 2005 and final year 2009, the IT countries had higher GDP p.c. 
in both years and although both groups of countries rise in terms of GDP p.c., the 
percentage change for the crisis period was 2.2% for ITs and 15.89% for non-ITs. 
Therefore the results again might reflect the depreciation of the ER to USD rather than 
changes in real output. The data for model 4 (beginning 2007, final 2009) also show higher 
values of the variable for the IT countries in both years, however, the change was bigger 
for the non-IT countries. 
Table 21: GDP per capita (USD) – model 3 and 4 
Country 
Beginning 
2005 
Final 
2009 Change 
Beginning 
2007 Change 
IT           
Brazil 4741,03 8230,31 3489,28 7184,84 1045,47 
Chile 7255,69 9644,46 2388,77 9877,01 -232,55 
Colombia 3405,61 5125,86 1720,25 4674,60 451,26 
Ghana 489,17 1097,83 608,66 1077,02 20,81 
Guatemala 2140,99 2660,73 519,74 2554,57 106,16 
Hungary 10924,45 12867,72 1943,27 13798,75 -931,03 
Indonesia 1304,08 2349,38 1045,29 1923,29 426,08 
Mexico 8235,08 8142,97 -92,11 9741,43 -
69 
 
1598,46 
Peru 2851,89 4468,55 1616,66 3770,54 698,01 
Philippines 1155,89 1752,45 596,56 1623,91 128,54 
South 
Africa 5234,58 5785,99 551,41 5932,82 -146,83 
Thailand 2674,20 3892,51 1218,31 3689,37 203,14 
Turkey 6786,38 8214,89 1428,52 8864,69 -649,79 
Uruguay  5252,37 9420,48 4168,11 7205,96 2214,52 
Mean 4460,82 5975,30 1514,48 5851,34 123,95 
Non-IT           
Argentina  4729,82 7626,19 2896,37 6603,85 1022,34 
Kenya  523,16 738,05 214,89 719,55 18,50 
Madagascar  286,05 437,68 151,63 394,68 43,01 
Malawi  201,80 309,73 107,93 239,51 70,22 
Nigeria  796,78 1118,11 321,33 1123,20 -5,09 
Uganda  313,60 490,46 176,86 388,16 102,30 
Zambia  609,69 989,92 380,23 926,60 63,33 
Dominican 
Rep.  3566,82 4637,02 1070,21 4209,90 427,12 
India  761,97 1192,08 430,11 1104,59 87,49 
Pakistan  703,59 954,52 250,93 880,56 73,96 
Bahrain  18500,16 26020,98 7520,82 24320,79 1700,19 
Bolivia  1039,98 1758,11 718,13 1377,51 380,60 
Bulgaria  3733,21 6423,35 2690,14 5498,04 925,32 
China  1731,13 3744,36 2013,23 2651,26 1093,10 
Ecuador  2846,85 4201,76 1354,91 3432,02 769,74 
Mauritius  5054,36 6734,55 1680,19 5965,96 768,59 
Nicaragua  893,26 1069,09 175,83 1004,13 64,96 
Venezuela, 
RB,  5481,30 11490,03 6008,73 8252,05 3237,98 
Zimbabwe  447,56 449,18 1,62 403,10 46,09 
Mean 2748,48 4230,80 1482,32 3657,65 573,14 
Source: (The World Bank 2011) 
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-33 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 532,207 225,704 2,3580 0,02509 ** 
Beginning_2005 0,345687 0,0522632 6,6143 <0,00001 *** 
D -559,773 430,721 -1,2996 0,20363  
 
Mean dependent var  1495,964  S.D. dependent var  1731,909 
Sum squared resid  43564543  S.E. of regression  1205,052 
R-squared  0,546128  Adjusted R-squared  0,515870 
F(2, 30)  23,06492  P-value(F)  8,58e-07 
Log-likelihood -279,3635  Akaike criterion  564,7271 
Schwarz criterion  569,2166  Hannan-Quinn  566,2377 
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White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 9,3009  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 9,3009) = 0,054003 
 
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-33 Dependent variable: Change 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 397,671 142,941 2,7821 0,00925 *** 
Beginning_2007 0,0479741 0,026815 1,7891 0,08370 * 
D -554,43 299,211 -1,8530 0,07375 * 
 
Mean dependent var  382,5778  S.D. dependent var  866,9577 
Sum squared resid  20713001  S.E. of regression  830,9232 
R-squared  0,138814  Adjusted R-squared  0,081401 
F(2, 30)  3,598901  P-value(F)  0,039725 
Log-likelihood -267,0961  Akaike criterion  540,1922 
Schwarz criterion  544,6817  Hannan-Quinn  541,7028 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity -  Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 9,86365  with p-value = P(Chi-Square(4) > 9,86365) = 0,0427882 
 
The negative dummy coefficient in the models 3 and 4 shows the negative values of 
dummy coefficient. This might be caused by the changes in the ER as well as by the 
convergence issue discussed in the previous section. The results are significant for the 
model 4 however, in both models the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected, 
therefore the outcomes might not be fully reliable. 
6. Other indicators of economic stability 
6.1. National interest rate – central bank discount rate 
The maintenance of the inflation targeting monetary policy is done mainly through the 
moves in the interest rate, changes in the main policy rate of the central bank. The 
movements of the interest rate influence the evolution of the economy through the 
availability of the credit to the economic agents, while performing so called loosening. Or 
it can act reversely through the unavailability of the credit, the tightening of the interest 
rates (de Carvalho Filho 2010, 6) Following estimations and calculations were done using 
the data from the IMF IFS for national interest rates – central bank discount rates 
comparing the selected countries. The discount rates maintained by the bank through the 
years 2001 to 2010 are summarized in the table 22. 
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Table 22: National interest rates – CB discount rates, summary statistics  
  
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. 
Dev. 
Central and Eastern Europe 
IT 
Albania 6,22 5,75 5 10,75 1,24 
Hungary 8,42 8,25 5,25 12,5 2 
Poland 6,2 5,25 3,5 19 3,5 
Serbia 13,78 13,41 8 30,3 4,21 
Turkey 34,58 27 14 60 15,51 
Non-IT 
Bulgaria 3 2,82 0,17 5,77 1,44 
Latvia 4,16 4 3 6 1,02 
Lithuania 3,35 3 1,75 5,25 1,25 
Macedonia 7,31 6,5 5 10,7 1,68 
Developing Asia 
IT 
Indonesia 10,34 9,01 6,2 17,67 3,38 
Philippines 5,36 5,05 3,08 11,93 1,8 
Thailand 3,54 3,5 1,75 6,5 1,27 
Non-IT 
China_M 3,11 3,24 2,7 4,14 0,42 
India 6,16 6 6 8 0,35 
Pakistan 10,24 9,5 7,5 15 2,35 
Vietnam 6,32 5 4,8 15 2,25 
Latin America and Caribbean 
IT 
Brazil 21,71 20,94 15,17 33,9 4,7 
Chile 3,97 3,65 0,48 10,16 2,29 
Colombia 10,69 11,25 5 18,5 2,99 
Peru 4,86 4,25 2,05 14 2,25 
Uruguay 49,64 20 7 328,09 69,67 
Non-IT 
Paraguay 20 20 20 20 0 
Venezuela 31,53 29,5 28,5 50 4,51 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
IT 
Ghana 19,41 18,5 12,5 27,5 5,07 
South_Africa 9,3 9 5,5 13,5 2,28 
Non-IT 
Malawi 28,86 25 15 75,33 13,79 
Gambia 15,27 11 9 29 7,26 
Nigeria 12,88 13 6 20,5 4,32 
Euro area and United States of America 
Euro_area 3,61 3,5 1,75 5,75 1,19 
United_States 2,87 2,25 0,5 6,25 1,96 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
The data in the table 22 are monthly observations from 2001:01 to 2010:12. The volatility 
of the rate can serve as an indicator for the authority´s need to use their key policy 
instrument. Estimating the above listed inflation targeting countries, the volatility of the 
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central banks´ interest rate is higher than for the non-targeting economies. However, if the 
countries with the extreme values of the interest rate changes are eliminated (specifically 
Uruguay and Turkey) the data show slightly lower volatility in targeting economies than 
among the non-IT countries. Adding the observations for the advanced economies, the 
averages of standard deviations of the discount rate are summarized in the table 23. 
Table 23: Volatility of the CB interest rate (national rates IFS IMF) 2001:01-
2010:12
16
 
Standard deviation - mean, % p.a. 
IT  2,84 
Non-IT  3,12 
Euro area and the U.S. 1,58 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
As might have been expected, according to their higher overall economic development and 
historical experience with the maintaining stable economy indicators, the Euro area and 
U.S. together show lower levels of interest rate volatility. Regarding the time period of the 
crisis, the moves of the interest rate levels were as follows. 
Figure 15: The crisis period – evolution of the central bank interest rate  
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
The inflation targeting countries followed similar path as the non-targeting economies 
(figure 15). The answers to the shocks derived from the actions of the global economy are 
one of the factors supporting the similarities in the path of the interest rate. With the 
upcoming crisis, the interest rates for both groups increased and were at their peak in the 
middle of the 2008 for non-ITs and in November 2008 for ITs. This was the period of high 
commodity prices as explained in the section 4.1.1 (page 30). From the peak until the end 
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of the 2009 IT countries lowered the deposit rate. This might be because of the intention to 
keep inflation close to the targets helping the economy to recover while making the credit 
more accessible to the economic agents. On the contrary, the non-ITs were not decreasing 
the rate significantly and at the end of the 2010 increased the rate while at the same time 
ITs further decreased it. Unfortunately, the observations used for this particular case are 
limited for the last three months of the 2010. Therefore the depicted development of the 
interest rate from October to December 2010 rates might have been actually slightly 
different in reality. 
6.2. The balance of trade 
Regarding the trade balance of the emerging market economies of the interest, the values 
of the exports and imports performed by the IT and non-IT economies differed for major 
part of the tracked period. Following figure 16 shows the evolution of exports and imports 
from year 1994 to 2009 (national currency). Between years 1994 and 1997, the amounts of 
trade were similar for ITs and non-ITs but from 1998 the dispersion in magnitude is bigger 
and bigger and the IT countries are shifting away from values of non-IT in both exports 
and imports.  
Figure 16: Imports and Exports in EMEs, 1994 - 2009 
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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These facts determine the resulting deficit in trade for both groups of countries. The non-
ITs perform the deficit of lower amounts however they showed lower amounts in both 
variables in the whole period and this might be a cause of less open economies while 
compared to IT countries (Ghani 2009). The trade balance over the period is depicted in 
the figure 17. 
Figure 17: Trade balance, 1994 - 2009 
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
Since the exports and imports are of nominal values, the bottom of 2008 as shown in figure 
17 reflects also the higher commodity prices that hit the global economy at that time. 
While trying to find the contribution of the IT regime, the regression for difference-in-
differences (as introduced in chapter 5) was also run in this case. However, the results were 
not robust. Exports and imports have delivered positive coefficients of dummy variable in 
the pre-crisis state (2002 – 2007) but had not fit into the significance level and also the fit 
of the data was very low in both cases. The heteroskedasticity might have been present in 
the crisis period regressions (2007-2009). This would mean that during the crisis, the IT 
regime could not have been any help in the trade of the countries. However, the model 
used small number of observations (varying from 13 to 17) and this most probably stands 
behind the low R
2
 and fit of the data. 
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6.3. GDP and CPI pre-crisis and crisis observations of volatility  
Volatility of the GDP percentage change in volume is compared in the periods before and 
during the crisis. 2001-2007 stands for the pre-crisis period where all the IT countries 
already adopted inflation targeting (on the average the year 2002). The crisis period is here 
represented by values of years 2008 – 2009. The comparison is displayed in the figure 18 
and the countries are grouped in to the categories of the geographical and economical 
closeness. In the graphs, the line with the diamond shaped points depicts the first period, 
2001-2007, and the line with square shaped points shows the second period, 2008-2009. 
Unfortunately not enough data were available for the year 2010. The vertical line divides 
the countries in the graph, all countries on the left of the line are the IT countries and those 
on the right are non-IT countries. 
The Central and Eastern Europe emerging economies performed lower volatility of the 
GDP than the group of non-IT countries for both periods. Even the change between the 
periods was higher for non-ITs (1.16%) than for IT countries (0.71%). This is probably 
caused by the lack of observations for the non-IT and extreme value of the Turkey standard 
deviation in first period. Regarding the countries from the Developing Asia region, the 
non-IT economies performed on average higher volatility in both periods, for 1.49% in the 
pre-crisis framework and for 0.87 % for the crisis period. Countries of the Latin America 
and Caribbean performed volatility of the GDP of 4.22 % for the non-ITs and 2.84 % for 
the ITs in the first period.  The IT countries therefore performed better in the sense of 
higher economic stability.  
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Figure 18: The GDP standard deviation pre- and post-crisis observations 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
However, during the crisis, the volatility of the non-ITs decreased to the levels equal to 
those of ITs.  Last graph includes unfortunately only one representative of the Sub-Saharan 
IT economy, which performed better (in terms of lower volatility) than the average of the 
non-ITs in both periods.  
Similarly, the volatility of the inflation for the selected countries is displayed in the 
following set of tables of the standard deviations for the periods 2001:01 – 2007:04 and 
2007:05 – 2010:12. 
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Figure 19: The CPI standard deviation pre- and post-crisis observations 
 
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
The figure 19 presents standard deviations in the pre- and post- crisis periods for the 
respective categories of the countries. The vertical line divides the graph in the way that to 
the left of the line, the values of IT countries are displayed and to the right of the line, the 
values of the non-IT emerging market economies of the category are shown. 
The upper left graph depicting the CEE countries show significant change in standard 
deviation between the periods for the IT economies. This is caused mainly by extreme 
values of Serbia and Turkey. However, the volatility of CPI decreased for the second 
period on average by 10.16 percentage points. The non-IT countries went conversely while 
they presented lower volatility in the first period and during the crisis and the average 
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volatility for this subgroup increased by approximately 17.46 percentage points.
17
 The 
Developing Asia (upper right graph of figure 19) IT countries faced similar volatilities 
before and during the crisis but still the values were higher in the second period, 
approximately by 0.55 percentage points. Same implies for the non-IT countries which 
before the crisis had similar volatility values to ITs but in the second period those values 
increased. The difference is in this case higher, the non-IT faced during the crisis 
approximately 1.86 percentage point higher volatility of CPI. The Latin America and 
Caribbean countries went through the decrease of CPI volatility. Change for the ITs was 
small, approximately 0.24 % but the non-IT showed 3.01% difference for crisis period. 
However, the high volatility for the non-ITs in the first period was enhanced especially by 
the Dominican Republic data, also Argentina and Haiti contributed to the high number. 
Therefore the behaviour of particular countries could have affected the results for the 
whole group. The last category, Sub-Saharan Africa, includes limited number of IT 
countries. Again, the decline for both ITs and non-ITs is present between the periods but it 
is bigger for the IT countries than for the rest of the sample (2.55% for ITs; 1.60 % for the 
non-ITs).    
The evidence suggests that the IT countries were slightly more volatile in the first period 
than the non-ITs (5.73% and 4.44% respectively). However, in the crisis period, where the 
economies need the stabile variables more than in any other situation, the average CPI 
volatility was 2.63% for the ITs and 7.94% for the group of non-ITs. Therefore the 
countries using the IT performed better in the framework of the global financial crisis than 
corresponding emerging non-IT economies. 
6.4. Unemployment rate 
Regarding the unemployment rate, the regression ran for the data did not bring any 
evidence of the effects of the IT regime. The data show similar behaviour of the variable 
for the IT as well as the non-IT countries. 
Figure 20: The unemployment rate, 2001-2009  
 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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As depicted in the figure 20, the non-IT countries unemployment was on the average 
higher than in IT countries, but the difference was not large, it ranged between one and two 
percentage points. To enable the comparison with advanced countries unemployment rate 
for the same time framework, the Euro Area was chosen. The values were lower but from 
the 2005 followed same path as the emerging market economies. For all three groups, the 
unemployment rate declined and reached the bottom in 2008 from where it again started to 
increase. The raise was steepest for the non-IT countries and the IT countries faced 
smoothest increase from those three groups.  It can be assumed that the IT regime helped 
with the stabilization of the economy in terms of volatility of inflation and the growth and 
therefore also the unemployment behaved in predictable and smooth way. However, as 
stated above, the difference in difference regression did not bring significant evidence to 
support the IT dummy in this case. 
Table 24: Summary of statistics, unemployment rate, 2001-2009  
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. 
Dev. 
IT           
Albania 14,38 14,28 12,75 16,40 1,26 
Armenia 8,52 8,20 6,27 10,80 1,72 
Brazil 10,07 9,97 7,89 12,32 1,54 
Chile 8,17 7,81 7,12 10,00 1,02 
Colombia 12,91 12,00 11,20 15,40 1,61 
Hungary 7,02 7,13 5,72 10,01 1,39 
Mexico 3,25 3,58 1,80 5,45 1,14 
Peru 8,92 8,90 8,30 9,50 0,53 
Philippines 9,69 11,10 7,30 11,80 2,05 
Poland 15,94 16,22 9,93 19,92 3,85 
Romania 6,58 6,29 3,98 9,97 2,00 
South_Africa 24,63 23,93 22,30 28,85 2,19 
Thailand 1,97 1,88 1,37 3,32 0,63 
Turkey 10,53 10,30 8,35 14,01 1,49 
Uruguay 12,16 12,20 7,32 17,00 3,73 
Mean 10,32 10,25 8,11 12,98 1,74 
Non-IT           
Argentina 12,55 11,58 7,90 18,06 4,08 
Bulgaria 11,29 10,10 5,60 19,78 4,99 
China_P_R___Mai 4,10 4,20 3,60 4,30 0,22 
China_P_R__Maca 4,58 4,10 3,00 6,40 1,36 
Dominican_Repub 16,17 16,10 14,10 18,40 1,36 
Latvia 9,74 9,00 6,03 17,18 3,42 
Lithuania 7,94 6,67 3,43 13,73 3,99 
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Macedonia__FYR 34,50 34,93 30,52 37,30 2,51 
Mauritius 8,02 7,70 6,90 9,53 0,91 
Pakistan 7,06 7,69 5,20 8,30 1,29 
Venezuela__Rep_ 12,02 12,25 7,36 18,00 3,82 
Mean 11,63 11,30 8,51 15,54 2,54 
Euro_Area 8,46 8,42 7,52 9,44 0,66 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
Table 24 summarises the main statistics characterising the unemployment rate from the 
2001 to 2009. Regarding the movements in the unemployment rate before the crisis and 
during, following table depicts the data. The unemployment rate changed for both 
categories almost for the same percentage points, 0.72 % decline for the ITs and 0.79 % 
decline for the non-ITs. However, the non-ITs performed higher volatility in the rate both 
pre- and during the crisis, as presented by table 25.  
 
Table 25: Standard deviation of the unemployment, periods 2001-2007 and 2008-2009 
Variable  
2001-
2007 
2008-
2009 Variable  
2001-
2007 
2008-
2009 
IT     non-IT     
Albania 1,07 0,16 Argentina 3,81 0,58 
Armenia 1,50 0,39 Bulgaria 4,69 0,87 
Brazil 1,14 0,13 China_P_R___Mai 0,23 0,07 
Chile 0,94 1,40 China_P_R__Maca 1,32 0,42 
Colombia 1,65 0,49 Dominican_Repub 1,11 0,57 
Hungary 0,79 1,55 Latvia 2,20 6,86 
Mexico 0,80 1,04 Lithuania 3,81 5,60 
Peru 0,48 0,07 Macedonia__FYR 2,68 1,13 
Philippines 1,86 0,05 Mauritius 0,96 0,17 
Poland 2,61 0,77 Pakistan 1,14 0,00 
Romania 2,00 1,64 Venezuela__Rep_ 3,33 0,37 
South_Africa 2,38 0,71 Mean 2,30 1,51 
Thailand 0,64 0,11 
   Turkey 0,74 2,15 
   Uruguay 3,01 0,19 
   Mean 1,44 0,72 
   Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
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7. Possible future development  
Organisations, such as the IMF, report the “two-speed recovery” that is performed by 
global economy.  This division in recovery is caused by the slow growth and high 
unemployment rates in advanced economies (crucial are the stresses coming from the Euro 
Area) on one side and better performing emerging economies on the other side.  
Forecasts are positive in terms of further growth for EMEs while it is expected to be of 
high values (6.5%).  The Developing Asia grows as the fastest area, followed by Sub-
Saharan Africa, which has a significant share on the growth of EMEs as a whole. This is 
happening mainly because of strong domestic demand and rising global commodity 
demand. It is expected that the prices of commodities will stay in high levels and that there 
might be fear of rising inflation in some of the EMEs. The fast growth in these countries is 
narrowing the difference between the actual and potential output. Therefore the 
overheating issues emerged. The overheating, rising inflation and possible difficulties to 
access the credit, since the tightening of advanced countries banks policies could spread to 
EMEs, are the main risks faced by EMEs.  
These economies stand for 40% “of global consumption” and are performing 2/3 of the 
growth globally. Therefore is the development in these countries of crucial importance in 
the recovery for all economies in the world. The re-balance would be much difficult to 
achieve if the EMEs would perform a slowdown. This is the most important reason why to 
access the proper monetary policy for the EMEs and the inflation targeting seems to be the 
one which posses of good outcomes in economy stabilization and is therefore appropriate 
for the implementation.  
Since advanced economies need to implement policies to enhance the growth, beneficial 
spillovers are expected in EMEs. There are going to face the need to manage the “capital 
inflows, overheating pressures and external re-balancing”. Another issue can possibly 
emerge from the practice of the US, the quantitative easing, that might have affected the 
EMEs with the capital inflows. Since the quantitative easing brings the middle term rates 
to low values. However, in the situation of “overheating pressures”, the monetary 
tightening would be more appropriate.  But any strong limitations in inflows of credit 
would not be positive for the economies either. Therefore the balance in credit growth 
maintenance needs to be found to not to become “excessive” (IMF 2011). 
Regarding the IT framework as such, the opinions on its future development differ among 
the relevant literature authors. There are of course advocates as well as opponents of this 
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framework. For example Carl Walsh, who is together with Lars Svensson the leader of the 
theoretical works done on the inflation targeting field (Posen 2008), suggests that the 
inflation targeting regime is well suited to survive the crisis. He points out that the 
financial crisis was one of the first “real tests” for this monetary policy regime, which is 
true especially for the majority of EMEs used in this work since the average year of 
adoption is for them 2002, but that it still can work well. This should be because of the 
flexibility of this regime, the anchored expectations of future inflation rates. That is in line 
with the aspect of credibility of the central bank under IT and its communication strategies 
of the policy to the public (Walsh, Inflation targeting: What have we learned? 2009). 
On the other hand e.g. Adam Posen
18
 changes his very positive view on the IT while he 
says that it is an overrated concept and that the central banks should be aware of “too low 
targets and too strict enforcement of it” since they could easily tighten the monetary policy 
too much, therefore should remain flexible as Walsh suggests above. Posen also points out 
that the accountability gains have not materialize and therefore should not be stated as 
possible benefits of the IT regime (Posen 2008). 
Discussion relating to the IT and crisis can be shown on the following two contradictory 
examples. The first view is negative in terms of IT and suggests that this regime is an 
inadequate approach of “one-tool one target” as stated e.g by Blanchflower. According to 
this view, the IT cannot work “alone” and new tools are required to be included in to the 
regime. Those tools should cover the issues of “global imbalances, perception of risk in 
economy and stress in financial sector” which according to those authors lacks so far in the 
IT. Other requirements are e.g. macro-prudential instruments that needs to be added, such 
as to influence of bank lending behaviour, or the inclusion of the prices of houses into the 
CPI (Blanchflower 2009). 
The second view is here represented by Wren-Lewis, who suggests that there is no need to 
re-assess the monetary policy because of the crisis. He says that it was caused by “too lax” 
regulation and therefore the regulatory tools to control financial sector are needed rather 
than the changes in IT itself (Wren-Lewis 2010).  
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8. Conclusion 
This work estimated data for selected emerging countries and through the comparison and 
regressions of the main economic indicators evaluated the performance of the IT countries 
in relation to the non-IT economies through previous years and especially through the 
crisis of 2007-2010. The countries from the control group were selected as the 
representatives of monetary policy frameworks other than IT. The results are applicable as 
a comparison of the regimes. However, the future works could use the data more separately 
and assess the monetary frameworks in contrast to each other. This work takes the other 
regimes, monetary aggregate target and exchange rate anchor, mostly together as the one 
alternative to the IT.   
Significant results supporting the presence of inflation targeting effects on the selected 
EMEs are derived in this work. These are the issues of less volatile behaviour of main 
economic indicators, CPI and GDP, and the overall more stable economic environment. 
Regarding the CPI changes, IT countries performed greater reduction in this variable than 
the non-ITs for the pre-crisis period of 1990-2007. This is underlined with the regression 
outcomes which assign -2.7% additional reduction of CPI for the countries using the IT 
regime. During the crisis, the dummy coefficient of the interest should be positive since it 
would help to preserve inflation rate in positive values and prevent possible problems 
caused by deflation. This assumption was also confirmed by the regression and therefore 
the additional help of IT regime in terms of low, positive levels of inflation rate was 
performed during the crisis. The volatility of the main variable of the interest, CPI, was 
according to the regressions also lower for IT countries. It showed lower values in both 
pre-crisis and crisis periods and therefore indicated more stable environment in IT 
countries than in non-IT countries. Lower volatility was even more significant during the 
crisis, therefore the IT framework can be assumed as better performing in these severe 
economic situations.  
Estimating the GDP percentage changes in volume, the behaviour of this variable was not 
that strongly positive as in some other works. From the simple comparison was derived 
that the IT countries have not changed much in the values of GDP % change in the period 
before the crisis (-0.05%) however the non-ITs have increased the values (4.37%).  The 
models suggested that the changes in GDP volume were smaller and even of negative sign 
for the IT countries for both periods. Although some of the results have not showed 
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corresponding significance of the dummy coefficient of negative value.  The non-IT 
countries performed bigger and positive percentage changes in GDP volume in the first 
period. During the crisis both groups faced severe declines in GDP % change according to 
the data, -6.76% for ITs and -9.29% for non-ITs. Models have delivered very low positive 
coefficient of dummy, which would be supportive for the IT regime in terms of ability to 
maintain positive GDP % change during the crisis, however the outcome was not 
significant.  
The variety of issues which might have contributed to this evolution of the GDP changes in 
the IT EMEs and their non-IT counterparts could have influenced the outcomes of the 
regressions. The IT countries begun with higher GDP % change values in 1980 than non-
ITs but the values for 2007 show that the ITs remained almost at the same level but the 
non-ITs increased the values for approximately 4%. This would be the state of the beta 
convergence since the IT countries could have already reached the higher convergence 
state and therefore later grew on the lower level than the non-ITs, therefore the GDP 
percentage changes would be lower.  
To ensure that the individual years, used for estimations presented above, do not stay for 
extremes of values achieved, e.g. because of the different position in the business cycle etc. 
the regressions using averages of the periods pre- and after-adoption of IT were run. The 
model again showed lower GDP % change for those periods and on average the 
movements in the variable were 0.72% for ITs and 1.92% for non-ITs. Therefore the data 
have not proved existence of additional increase in GDP percentage changes in volume 
under the IT framework. Regarding the variability of the GDP, it was lower for both pre-
crisis and crisis periods. Before the crisis, the IT countries experienced additional -1.2% 
decrease in GDP volatility compared to non-ITs. The crisis state meant increase in 
volatility for both groups of countries however the IT countries performed lower volatility 
than non-ITs (3.82% and 4.55% respectively).  
The behaviour of other selected variables indicating the state of the economies of interest 
was following. The national interest rate (CB discount rate) performed lower volatility in 
the IT economies than in the non-IT countries. Before the crisis, the rates in both groups 
followed similar path. From the peak in 2008 the ITs were lowering the IR enabling the 
economies a possible recovery but the non-ITs showed almost no decline and at the end of 
2010 even increased the values. This could be possible due to the pressure on the fixed ER 
faced during the crisis. ITs at the same time decreased the IR values further. The 
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unemployment rate data behaved similar through the periods for both groups of MP 
regimes and the regression have not delivered any plausible outcome. However, on the 
average the non-ITs performed higher unemployment rate than the IT countries. The 
countries hit the bottom of the unemployment rate in the 2008 and after that the ITs 
performed the smoothest increase in values and the non-ITs faced steep increase in 
unemployment rate after the bottom state. This also explains the higher volatility of this 
rate performed by the non-ITs (2.54%) than by ITs (1.74%). The ER per SDR showed that 
for the IT economies is less volatile and therefore its smoother behaviour might support the 
predictability of the trade conditions in the IT countries. Increased predictability is actually 
aim of the CB under the IT since it contributes to maintain the credibility. 
According to the delivered outcomes it can be said that the IT proved as a reasonable and 
suitable monetary policy to maintain the price stability and less volatile economic 
indicators in the emerging market economies. Compared to emerging countries not 
adopting inflation targeting, the ITs performed lower volatility of the GDP and CPI as well 
as lower CPI levels which can be to certain level attributed to the IT regime. This holds 
especially for the crisis period where IT regime contributed to the performance of the IT 
countries also significantly and showed its ability to enhance the economic performance of 
the EMEs under the severe circumstances.  
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 Annex 1: Preconditions and current conditions 
 
Source: (Batini, Kuttner a Laxton 2005, 176) 
  
 Annex 2 Monetary policy regimes 
 
 
  
Source: (IMF 2008) 
1 Includes countries that have no explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitor various indicators in 
conducting monetary policy. 
2 The member participates in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. 
3 The member participates in the ERM II. 
4 The member participates in the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union. 
5 The member participates in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. 
6 The central bank has taken preliminary step toward inflation targeting and is preparing for the transition to 
full-fledged inflation targeting. 
7 The member participates in the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
8 As of end-December 1989. 
Source: (IMF 2008) 
  
Annex 3 Groups of countries according to the level of a development 
Advanced Economies 
   Euro Area 
   Major Advanced Economies (G7) 
   Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 
   Other Advanced Economies (Advanced Economies excluding G7 and 
Euro Area) 
European Union 
Emerging and Developing Economies 
   Central and Eastern Europe 
   Commonwealth of Independent States 
   Developing Asia 
       ASEAN-5 
   Latin America and the Caribbean 
   Middle East and North Africa 
   Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Advanced Economies 
Australia Iceland Singapore 
Austria Ireland Slovak Republic 
Belgium Israel Slovenia 
Canada Italy Spain 
Cyprus Japan Sweden 
Czech 
Republic 
Korea Switzerland 
Denmark Luxembourg Taiwan Province of China 
Finland Malta United Kingdom 
France Netherlands United States 
Germany New Zealand   
Greece Norway   
Hong Kong 
SAR 
Portugal   
 
Euro Area 
Austria Germany Netherlands 
Belgium Greece Portugal 
Cyprus Ireland Slovak Republic 
Estonia Italy Slovenia 
Finland Luxembourg Spain 
France Malta   
(Additional source: http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/map.en.html) 
Major Advanced Economies (G7) 
Canada Japan 
France United Kingdom 
Germany United States 
Italy   
 
Newly Industrialized Asian Economies 
Hong Kong SAR Singapore 
Korea Taiwan Province of China 
 
Other Advanced Economies 
(Advanced Economies excluding G7 and Euro Area) 
Australia Israel Sweden 
Czech Republic Korea Switzerland 
 Denmark New Zealand Taiwan Province of China 
Hong Kong 
SAR  Norway   
Iceland Singapore   
 
European Union 
Austria Germany Netherlands 
Belgium Greece Poland 
Bulgaria Hungary Portugal 
Cyprus Ireland Romania 
Czech Republic Italy Slovak Republic 
Denmark Latvia Slovenia 
Estonia Lithuania Spain 
Finland Luxembourg Sweden 
France Malta United Kingdom 
 
Emerging and Developing Economies 
Afghanistan, Islamic 
Republic of Gambia, The Oman 
Albania Georgia Pakistan 
Algeria Ghana Panama 
Angola Grenada 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Paraguay 
Argentina Guinea Peru 
Armenia Guinea-Bissau Philippines 
Azerbaijan Guyana Poland 
Bahamas, The Haiti Qatar 
Bahrain Honduras Romania 
Bangladesh Hungary Russia 
Barbados India Rwanda 
Belarus Indonesia Samoa 
Belize Iran, Islamic Republic of 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Benin Iraq Saudi Arabia 
Bhutan Jamaica Senegal 
Bolivia Jordan Serbia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Kazakhstan Seychelles 
Botswana Kenya Sierra Leone 
Brazil Kiribati Solomon Islands 
Brunei Darussalam Kosovo South Africa 
Bulgaria Kuwait Sri Lanka 
Burkina Faso Kyrgyz Republic St. Kitts and Nevis 
Burundi 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic St. Lucia 
 Cambodia Latvia 
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Cameroon Lebanon Sudan 
Cape Verde Lesotho Suriname 
Central African 
Republic Liberia Swaziland 
Chad Libya 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Chile Lithuania Tajikistan 
China 
Macedonia, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Tanzania 
Colombia Madagascar Thailand 
Comoros Malawi Timor-Leste 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Malaysia Togo 
Congo, Republic of Maldives Tonga 
Costa Rica Mali 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Côte d'Ivoire Mauritania Tunisia 
Croatia Mauritius Turkey 
Djibouti Mexico Turkmenistan 
Dominica Moldova Uganda 
Dominican Republic Mongolia Ukraine 
Ecuador Montenegro 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Egypt Morocco Uruguay 
El Salvador Mozambique Uzbekistan 
Equatorial Guinea Myanmar Vanuatu 
Eritrea Namibia Venezuela 
Estonia Nepal Vietnam 
Ethiopia Nicaragua 
Yemen, Republic 
of 
Fiji Niger Zambia 
Gabon Nigeria Zimbabwe 
Source: (IMF 2008) 
  
 Annex 4 Statistics for the CPI % change in volume, periods 2001-2007 and 2007-2010 
Statistics for Central and Eastern Europe before the crisis, observations 2001:01 - 
2007:04 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries 
Albania 3,0289 2,828 0,27578 7,7185 1,5032 
Hungary 5,7113 5,5467 2,2878 10,777 2,292 
Poland 2,4792 1,6654 0,078186 7,4627 1,8717 
Romania 16,059 13,4 3,655 40,321 10,082 
Serbia 27,628 13,376 3,4173 134,88 36,249 
Turkey 25,418 13,256 8,7169 73,157 19,564 
Exchange rate targeting countries 
Bulgaria 5,6469 5,6641 -0,55177 9,8164 2,4159 
Latvia 4,6538 4,5682 0,60753 8,8656 2,3193 
Lithuania 1,513 1,9298 -1,925 4,8591 1,9915 
Macedonia 2,1894 2,022 -0,82076 6,9755 1,9915 
 
 
           Statistics for the Central and Eastern Europe for the crisis, observations 2007:05 - 2010:12 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
Albania 3,0734 3,0466 1,4649 4,6506 0,90786 
Hungary 5,5191 5,4491 2,8957 8,5713 1,5775 
Poland 3,4362 3,667 1,5306 5,0251 0,89338 
Romania 6,3008 6,6202 3,801 9,0424 1,5616 
Serbia 8,6018 8,1936 3,0864 3,0864 3,6768 
Turkey 8,3472 8,3774 5,0761 12,065 1,9434 
Exchange rate targeters 
Bulgaria 6,6582 4,8343 -0,25165 15,279 5,134 
Latvia 6,9443 8,2186 -4,1345 17,929 7,2344 
Lithuania 5,7734 5,1815 -0,46838 12,523 4,1152 
Macedonia 3,2406 2,5787 -1,5172 8,8209 3,1529 
 
Statistics for Developing Asia before the crisis, observations 2001:01 - 2007:04 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
Indonesia 9,8067 8,5299 4,6135 18,381 3,8292 
Philippines 5,3833 5,3561 2,1946 8,5714 2,0165 
Thailand 2,6609 2,2777 0,23419 6,3123 1,6888 
Others 
China M 1,4592 1,35 -1,3 5,3 1,6007 
China  1,6969 -0,41005 -3,404 10,54 4,3744 
India 4,4204 4,2418 2,2312 7,563 1,2194 
Malaysia 2,0682 1,6634 0,38536 4,7619 1,0259 
Pakistan 5,7128 5,3777 1,4051 11,098 2,751 
Vietnam 5,1007 5,0897 -1,8745 10,238 3,2819 
 
Statistics for Developing Asia during the crisis, observations 2007:05 - 2010:12 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
Indonesia 6,5651 6,2739 2,4144 12,151 2,8934 
 Philippines 4,9797 4,0836 0,062383 12,412 3,3172 
Thailand 2,5702 2,9774 -4,3836 9,1725 2,9728 
Others 
China M 3,3395 3,4 -2 8,7 3,182 
China  4,5592 3,9577 -1,183 9,5708 3,3379 
India 9,6422 9,6296 5,4688 16,216 2,9687 
Malaysia 2,469 1,9504 -2,4411 8,5147 2,6751 
Pakistan 14,493 13,186 6,3737 25,33 5,4989 
Vietnam 12,358 9,2158 1,9771 28,312 7,724 
 
 
Statistics for Latin America and Caribbean before the crisis, observations 2001:01 - 2007:04 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
Brazil 7,6927 7,1173 2,9633 17,231 3,643 
Chile 2,7266 2,8051 -0,74707 4,6944 1,113 
Colombia 6,0865 5,9769 3,9383 8,4922 1,2653 
Guatemala 7,1844 7,1947 4,1739 9,8442 1,4307 
Mexico 4,6786 4,4762 2,9113 8,115 1,0508 
Peru 1,8683 1,8803 -1,1114 4,6128 1,3189 
Uruguay 9,6277 6,6459 3,4227 28,512 7,2023 
Others 
Argentina 10,703 8,9331 -1,7445 40,953 11,381 
Bolivia 3,5052 3,9262 -1,2652 7,1912 1,8606 
Dominican 
Republic 16,98 8,8968 -0,99992 65,292 18,34 
Haiti 18,638 15,279 7,9858 42,456 10,211 
Nicaragua 7,1463 7,0713 3,1438 10,815 2,298 
Paraguay 8,7515 7,9925 1,6304 20,854 4,2419 
Venezuela 19,579 17,974 10,314 38,679 7,1086 
 
Statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa before the crisis, observations 2001:01 - 2007:04 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
Ghana 18,55 14,873 8,7689 41,944 9,05 
South Africa 5,1063 4,7554 0,16447 13,007 3,1027 
Others 
Kenya 8,9361 8,7549 0,44547 19,142 5,2088 
Madagascar 11,083 10,857 -8,4465 29,321 8,9616 
Malawi 14,399 14,237 8,4161 29,321 4,8507 
Mauritius 5,9271 5,6402 3,1414 12,276 2,2269 
 
Statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa during the crisis, observations 2007:05 - 2010:12 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeters 
 Ghana 14,666 14,509 8,5761 20,742 4,1128 
South Africa 7,63 7,0391 3,214 13,715 2,9419 
Others 
Kenya 12,822 10,827 3,1732 29,993 9,1569 
Madagascar 9,0855 9,133 6,8507 11,663 1,2357 
Malawi 8,1571 7,9395 7,0057 10,052 0,86651 
Mauritius 5,6977 5,1745 0,085324 11,72 3,5933 
(Source: IMF IFS 02/11; own calculations) 
 
Annex 5 Statistics for the GDP % change in volume, periods 2001-2007 and 2008-
2009 
Statistics for Central and Eastern Europe before the crisis, observations 2001-2007 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries     
Albania 5,51744 undefined 5,51744 5,51744 0 
Hungary 3,427 3,77335 0,772868 4,5244 1,24449 
Poland 4,07008 3,86716 1,2053 6,78527 2,19863 
Romania 6,09331 5,55748 4,12448 8,47653 1,58267 
Turkey 5,0083 6,16384 -5,69748 9,36281 5,00268 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Bulgaria 5,6201 6,16726 4,06581 6,64167 0,961799 
Latvia 9,02872 8,67628 6,4716 12,2328 2,02616 
Lithuania 8,09769 7,80223 6,73595 10,2467 1,3988 
Macedonia 1,84606 3,28237 -4,52549 4,10204 3,35346 
 
Statistics for Central and Eastern Europe - the crisis, observations 2008-2009 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries    
Hungary -2,93257 -2,93257 -6,69269 0,82754 5,31761 
Poland 3,38219 3,38219 2,04699 4,71738 1,88825 
Romania 0,10919 0,10919 -7,13148 7,34986 10,2399 
Turkey -2,0146 -2,0146 -4,68803 0,658839 3,78081 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Bulgaria 0,497265 0,497265 -5,02688 6,02141 7,81232 
Latvia -11,0999 -11,0999 -17,9557 -4,24404 9,69561 
Lithuania -5,90712 -5,90712 -14,7417 2,92745 12,494 
 
Statistics for Developing Asia before the crisis, observations 2001-2007 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries     
Philippines 6,65509 5,53739 3,40024 12,4094 2,85552 
Indonesia 5,07039 5,03087 3,6435 6,34502 0,879848 
Thailand 5,09259 5,31757 2,16726 7,03293 1,53797 
 non-inflation targeting countries 
China_M 10,806 10,085 8,30032 14,1624 2,05742 
China 14,8405 14,1646 2,88837 27,3205 9,22987 
India 7,72206 8,51795 3,83655 9,7102 2,19007 
Malaysia 5,16311 5,7885 0,517675 6,78344 2,11668 
Pakistan 5,27854 5,68318 1,98243 7,66808 2,0943 
Vietnam 7,74755 7,78993 6,8949 8,45634 0,652638 
 
Statistics for Developing Asia - the crisis, observations 2008-2009 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries    
Philippines 5,18342 5,18342 4,01135 6,35549 1,65756 
Indonesia 5,27623 5,27623 4,54588 6,00657 1,03286 
Thailand 0,107545 0,107545 -2,24774 2,46283 3,33088 
non-inflation targeting countries 
China_M 9,37387 9,37387 9,11307 9,63467 0,368827 
China 7,13499 7,13499 1,32557 12,9444 8,21575 
India 7,07814 7,07814 6,71681 7,43947 0,510998 
Malaysia 1,49727 1,49727 -1,71375 4,70829 4,54107 
Pakistan 2,61422 2,61422 1,59594 3,6325 1,44007 
Vietnam 5,81715 5,81715 5,32338 6,31091 0,698289 
 
Statistics for Latin America and Caribbean before the crisis, observations 2001-2007 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries     
Brazil 3,43429 3,16 1,15 6,08 1,95239 
Chile 4,32412 4,58995 2,18411 6,04109 1,30789 
Colombia 9,66891 10,1392 6,77598 13,2501 2,15886 
Guatemala 3,83236 3,26011 2,3331 6,30406 1,48532 
Mexico 2,55665 3,27536 -0,0328261 5,05877 1,8694 
Peru 5,40289 5,55844 0,184471 8,69498 2,84021 
Uruguay 2,56986 4,32533 -11,0319 11,82 7,63371 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Argentina 4,12393 8,65924 -10,8945 9,17895 8,26253 
Bolivia 3,54812 4,1733 1,6838 4,79701 1,22821 
Dominican_Repub 5,29494 5,78821 -0,253359 10,6712 4,35506 
Haiti -0,0563332 0,0560405 -3,5163 2,31706 2,10774 
Nicaragua 3,29476 3,08114 0,753939 5,31217 1,47153 
Paraguay 3,42156 3,83961 -0,0485685 6,76134 2,11675 
Venezuela 4,87649 8,40028 -8,85565 18,2866 10,0176 
 
Statistics for Latin America and Caribbean - the crisis, observations 2008-2009 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
 Inflation targeting countries    
Brazil 2,475 2,475 -0,19 5,14 3,76888 
Chile 1,07956 1,07956 -1,52635 3,68547 3,68531 
Guatemala 1,93673 1,93673 0,57397 3,29949 1,92723 
Mexico -2,2396 -2,2396 -6,0068 1,52761 5,32763 
Peru 5,35686 5,35686 0,875454 9,83827 6,33767 
Uruguay 5,6965 5,6965 2,85774 8,53526 4,01461 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Argentina 3,80744 3,80744 0,651597 6,96329 4,46304 
Bolivia 6,1485 undefined 6,1485 6,1485 0 
Dominican_Repub 4,35485 4,35485 3,45405 5,25565 1,27392 
Nicaragua 0,65364 0,65364 -1,45243 2,75971 2,97843 
Paraguay 0,99001 0,99001 -3,84438 5,8244 6,83686 
Venezuela 4,82014 undefined 4,82014 4,82014 0 
 
Statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa before the crisis, observations 2001-2007 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries     
South_Africa 4,33652 4,55454 2,73546 5,60372 1,22406 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Malawi 3,57514 5,51849 -4,14632 7,70997 3,92296 
Madagascar 3,46459 5,25427 -12,6811 9,80074 7,32562 
Mauritius 3,60427 3,94762 1,24117 5,75403 1,76056 
Kenya 4,02896 4,43325 0,545282 6,11033 2,08347 
 
Statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa - the crisis, observations 2008-2009 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Inflation targeting countries    
South_Africa 0,94695 0,94695 -1,68218 3,57608 3,71815 
non-inflation targeting countries 
Malawi 8,16403 8,16403 7,54174 8,78632 0,880051 
Madagascar 1,27956 1,27956 -4,57024 7,12936 8,27287 
Mauritius 3,38207 3,38207 1,67484 5,0893 2,41439 
 
  
 Annex 6 Standard deviation and mean values of the GDP % volume change in 
periods B(1990-2001) and F(2001-2010), IT countries 
Std.Dev. Beginning Final Change Mean Beginning Final Change 
Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe 
Hungary 4,89 3,54 -1,35 Hungary 0,63 2,01 1,39 
Poland 7,79 1,84 -5,95 Poland 3,32 4,00 0,69 
Romania 6,29 6,23 -0,06 Romania 0,35 3,71 3,35 
Turkey 4,89 5,08 0,19 Turkey 4,58 1,88 -2,70 
Latin America and Caribbean Latin America and Caribbean 
Brazil 2,28 2,19 -0,08 Brazil 2,17 3,05 0,88 
Chile 3,73 2,43 -1,30 Chile 6,38 3,29 -3,09 
Colombia 2,97 3,11 0,14 Colombia 2,89 3,09 0,20 
Guatemala 0,81 2,22 1,41 Guatemala 3,71 3,76 0,05 
Mexico 3,53 3,26 -0,27 Mexico 3,37 1,49 -1,87 
Peru 4,59 2,88 -1,72 Peru 3,10 6,04 2,94 
Uruguay 3,70 6,67 2,97 Uruguay 2,83 2,79 -0,04 
Developing Asia Developing Asia 
Indonesia 5,05 0,68 -4,37 Indonesia 4,48 5,62 1,14 
Philippines 2,21 2,55 0,34 Philippines 3,14 6,69 3,56 
Thailand 6,22 2,68 -3,54 Thailand 5,23 4,06 -1,17 
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
South 
Africa 
2,15 2,13 -0,02 South Africa 1,64 3,64 2,00 
 Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
Standard deviation and mean values of the GDP % volume change in periods B(1990-
2001) and F(2001-2010), non-IT countries 
Std. Dev. Beginning Final Change Mean Beginning Final Change 
Central and Eastern Europe Central and Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 5,67 3,66 -2,01 Bulgaria -1,12 4,48 5,61 
Latvia 12,34 9,68 -2,66 Latvia -1,67 4,56 6,23 
Lithuania 10,07 7,69 -2,38 Lithuania -1,86 4,99 6,84 
Macedonia 4,49 3,35 -1,14 Macedonia -1,16 1,85 3,00 
Latin America and Caribbean Latin America and Caribbean 
Argentina 5,37 7,33 1,96 Argentina 3,00 4,05 1,06 
Bolivia 1,64 1,46 -0,18 Bolivia 3,68 3,87 0,20 
Dominican 
Republic 
4,22 3,82 -0,40 
Dominican 
Republic 
4,77 5,09 0,32 
Haiti 5,37 2,11 -3,26 Haiti -0,37 -0,06 0,31 
Nicaragua 2,56 2,02 -0,54 Nicaragua 3,38 2,71 -0,67 
Paraguay 2,48 3,22 0,73 Paraguay 1,93 2,88 0,95 
Venezuela 4,42 9,27 4,85 Venezuela 2,68 4,87 2,19 
Developing Asia Developing Asia 
China M 2,98 1,89 -1,09 China M 9,73 10,49 0,76 
China 4,80 9,16 4,36 China 3,22 13,13 9,90 
 India 1,79 1,93 0,13 India 5,67 7,58 1,91 
Malaysia 5,19 2,92 -2,27 Malaysia 6,82 4,35 -2,47 
Pakistan 2,05 2,22 0,17 Pakistan 3,84 4,69 0,85 
Vietnam 1,68 1,05 -0,63 Vietnam 7,31 7,32 0,00 
Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Kenya  1,78 2,08 0,30 Kenya  2,23 4,03 1,80 
Madagascar 3,19 7,05 3,86 Madagascar 2,25 2,98 0,73 
Malawi 8,39 3,97 -4,43 Malawi 2,04 4,59 2,56 
Mauritius 1,82 1,75 -0,07 Mauritius 5,23 3,55 -1,68 
Source: (IMF 2011); own calculations 
 
